Planning for the Second Century of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee by Miner, Roger J.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 65 
Number 3 Volume 65, Summer 1991, Number 3 Article 5 
April 2012 
Planning for the Second Century of the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals: The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 
Roger J. Miner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Miner, Roger J. (1991) "Planning for the Second Century of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: The 
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 65 : No. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol65/iss3/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
PLANNING FOR THE SECOND CENTURY
OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS: THE REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
ROGER J. MINER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The celebration of the Centennial of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit presents an excellent occasion to
consider the court's future as well as its past. Any planning for the
future must take account of the comprehensive report recently is-
sued by the Federal Courts Study Committee. The report identi-
fies a number of problems presently facing the entire system of
United States courts and proposes various long- and short-term so-
lutions to those problems. It recognizes that the structures, prac-
tices and traditions of the past are not to be lightly discarded and
that change for its own sake is to be avoided. It also recognizes
that essential needs for reform cannot be ignored. The purpose of
this Article is to review the major findings and recommendations
of the Study Committee Report relating to federal courts of ap-
peals and to evaluate them in light of the condition of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit at the inception of the court's sec-
ond one hundred years. Relevant to the evaluation are the special
institutional concerns, customs and requirements of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals as it begins the second century of its exis-
tence. For this court will prepare for its second century not only on
the basis of a study nationally undertaken; it also will turn to the
experiences of its own unique and distinguished past as, Janus-
like, it looks toward, and plans for, the future.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Adjunct Professor of
law, New York Law School.
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Circuit, as the court then was known, convened for the first time
on June 16, 1891 at the United States Post Office Building and
Courthouse, Park Row and Broadway in New York City. Present
at that first session were Associate Justice Samuel Blatchford of
the Supreme Court, who presided, and Circuit Judges William J.
Wallace and E. Henry Lacombe.' According to the original Minute
Book, the court appointed a Clerk, a Marshal, and a Crier, and
then adjourned until October 27, 1891.2 The court had been cre-
ated by the Act of March 3, 1891 ("Evarts Act"),3 popularly known
by the name of its principal sponsor, Senator William Evarts of
New York. A joint resolution of Congress required that each of the
nine circuit courts of appeals created by the Act hold its first meet-
ing on the third Tuesday in June 1891.1
The enormous caseloads of the federal courts provided the im-
petus for court reform in 1891. By that time, there were 42,584
cases pending in the federal courts of the nation, 21,990 of those in
the courts within the Second Circuit alone. Much of the increase
in litigation came about as a result of the expansion of commerce
and industry that followed the end of the Civil War." Legislation
enacted in 1875 conferring general federal question jurisdiction
upon the federal courts and expanding diversity jurisdiction7 con-
tributed in large measure to the heavy volume. Most affected were
the circuit courts in the Second Circuit. From 1789, the circuit
courts had exercised both trial and appellate jurisdiction. As origi-
nally constituted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the circuit courts
had no judges of their own and were comprised of a district court
judge and two Supreme Court Justices "riding circuit."8 The in-
crease in Supreme Court business over the years made it less and
less possible for the Justices to attend the sittings of the circuit
courts.
Eventually, in 1869, Congress created a circuit judgeship for
each of the nine circuits and provided that the circuit court could
be held by the circuit Justice, circuit judge, or district judge or by
1 U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, MINUTES 1891-1892, at 1
(original court document).
2 Id. at 41.
Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) [hereinafter Evarts Act].
' S. Con. Res. 17, 26 Stat. 1115, 1115-16 (1891).
' M. SCHICK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT 51 (1970).
" SECOND CIRCUIT REDBOOK 1989-1990, at 5 (1989).
Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
S Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74.
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one or more of them in combination.' A Justice was required to sit
with the circuit court in each district within his circuit only once
every two years.10 The Justices found it difficult to sit even once
every two years, and the circuit judges could not keep up with the
workload. Thus, by the late 1880's, district court judges sitting
alone disposed of eight-ninths of the circuit court litigation.11 The
federal courts were unable to cope with the volume of cases with
which they were confronted, and the courts of the Second Circuit,
despite the addition of another circuit judgeship in 1887,12 clearly
were inundated by the time of the adoption of the Evarts Act.
Although the Evarts Act provided for the appointment of two
circuit judges for each of the other eight courts of appeals, it pro-
vided for the appointment of three in the Second Circuit.13 This
action by Congress apparently was informed by the caseload exper-
iences of the past. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit attained full strength with the appointment of Judge Na-
thaniel Shipman, who joined Judges Wallace and Lacombe on the
court in March 1892.14 Approximately 196 cases were docketed
that year,15 and it appears that admiralty cases predominated. 16
The judges continued to sit as trial judges on the old circuit court
until 1911, when the old circuit court was abolished and the trial
jurisdiction of circuit courts was transferred to the district courts
throughout the nation. 17 As the caseloads in all federal courts in-
creased over the years owing to the expansion of the population
and federal court jurisdiction, the United States Courts of Appeals,
as they became known in 1948, s expanded as well. Today, there
are thirteen courts of appeals, including a court for the District of
Columbia Circuit, a court for each of eleven numbered circuits
(each covering three to ten states), and the specialized Court of
Act of April 10, 1869, ch. 22, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45.
10 Id. at 45.
11 J.B. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 70 (1987) (Second Circuit His-
torical Comm.).
2 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 347, 24 Stat. 492.
" Evarts Act, supra note 3, § 1; M. SCHICK, supra note 5, at 52.
14 See BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., JUDGES OF
THE UNITED STATES 281, 449, 513 (2d ed. 1983) (biographies of Judges Lacombe, Shipman
and Wallace).
16 M. SCHICK, supra note 5, at 58.
See J.B. MORRIS, supra note 11, at 94.
' Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
16 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 43(a), 62 Stat. 869, 870.
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 19 Prior to the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990,20 a total of 168 active judges were authorized to
sit in these courts.21 The 1990 Act added eleven judgeships, for a
total of 179, and the number in each court now ranges between six
in the First Circuit and twenty-eight in the Ninth Circuit.22 No
judgeships were added to the thirteen presently authorized in the
Second Circuit.
III. CURRENT CONDITIONS
The population of the United States tripled between 1900 and
1990, but appeals filed in the courts of appeals during the same
period rose from 1,093 to 40,898, a thirty-seven fold increase.2 3 In1945, there were fifty-nine judgeships and 2,730 filings (forty-six
filings per authorized judgeship) in all the courts of appeals in the
nation.24 Forty-five years later, in 1990, there were 156 judgeships
and 40,898 filings (262 per authorized judgeship),25 which repre-
sents an increase in appeals filed of 1,498% and an increase in fil-
ings per judgeship of 570%.2S
On June 30, 1989, 30,006 unresolved cases were pending in the
courts of appeals of the nation,27 and the median time interval be-
tween filing a notice of appeal and final disposition was 10.3
months.28 As of December 31, 1990, 32,736 cases were pending. 29
29 C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS §§ 3, 10 (4th ed. 1983).
20 Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. II, § 202, 104 Stat. 5089 [hereinafter Judicial Improvements
Act].
21 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1988) (amended 1990).
22 Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, tit. II, § 202, at 5098-5100.
23 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITEE, WORKING PAPERS & SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS
32, figure 1 (July 1, 1990) [hereinafter 1 WORKING PAPERS]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DREc-
TOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 136 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT].
24 Flanagan, Appellate Court Caseloads: A Statistical Overview (Sept. 14, 1989), in 2
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPERS & SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS, at table 1
(following p. 13) (July 1, 1990) [hereinafter 2 WORKING PAPERS].
21 REPORT 6F THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 52
(Sept. 12, 1990) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
2 See Flanagan, supra note 24. Statistics for the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit are excluded. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created
by Congress in 1982, see Pub. L. No. 97-164, tit. I, 96 Stat. 37 (1982), as a national appellate
court, and was given exclusive appellate jurisdiction in certain specialized matters, including
patents and Tariff Act disputes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988).
27 1989 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 23.
28 Id. at 151.
29 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS
19 (Dec. 31, 1990) [hereinafter WORKLOAD STATISTICS].
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The upward trend continued from 1988, when there were 37,524
filings (240 per authorized judgeship)," 27,644 cases pending at the
end of the 1988 statistical year,31 and a median time interval be-
tween filing and disposition of 10.1 months.32 According to the
1990 preliminary report of the Director of the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts, the number of cases appealed to
the regional courts of appeals reached 40,898 for the statistical
year ending June 30, 1990 "due to a significant increase of almost
1,500 appeals of criminal cases."3 3 The Director reported that
"[d]ispositions increased three percent this year to 38,520, but re-
mained below the level of filings, resulting in an eight percent in-
crease in the pending caseload by year's end."3
In the Second Circuit, the number of judgeships in the Court
of Appeals has increased from three in 1891 to thirteen in 1991, or
433%. Filings, however, have increased from 196 in 1892 (the first
full year of the court's operation) 5 to 3,424 in 1990,36 a gain of
1,747%. There have been substantial increases just in the last two
years. From 1988 to 1989, filings increased 7.8%, from 2,942 to
3,172.37 In 1990, there were 252 more filings than in 1989, an in-
crease of 7.9%. 3' The upward trend has begun to produce problems
for a court long known for the expeditious handling of its caseload.
In 1989, for the first time in many years, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit was unable to dispose of as many appeals as
were filed during the year. The shortfall for 1989 was 184 cases,
although some 2,988 cases were terminated-forty-six more than
were terminated in 1988.39 The shortfall for 1990 was held to 150,
with 3,274 cases terminated-286 more than were terminated in
1989.40 Even with greater effort in the disposition of cases, it has
10 1989 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 23.
3' Id. at 137.
22 Id. at 155.
PRELIMINARY JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 25.
34 Id.
35 M. SCHICK, supra note 5, at 58.
3' U.S. COURTS FOR THE SECOND Cmcurr, SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 1990, at 5 [hereinaf-
ter 1990 SECOND CIRcurr REPORT].
37 U.S. COURTS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 1989, at 4 [hereinaf-
ter 1989 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT].
1990 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 36, at 4.
29 1989 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 37.
40 1990 SECOND CmcuIT REPORT, supra note 36, at 4. It appears that the court in 1990
again succeeded in disposing of more cases than were filed. 3,495 appeals, a record high,
were docketed, and 3,614 appeals were disposed of during the statistical year 1990. Wise,
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not been possible to keep filings and terminations in balance.
Filings per judgeship in the Second Circuit rose from 226 in
1988 to 244 in 1989 to 263 in 1990. Surprisingly, median disposi-
tion times for those years remained fairly constant--6.5 months in
1988,41 6.1 months in 1989,42 and 6.5 months in 1990.4s For many
years the fastest circuit in the nation in terms of appeals, the Sec-
ond apparently was "outgunned" by the Third in 1990.4" The con-
tinuing increase in the number of appeals filed, however, points to
an inevitable future increase in the time required for the disposi-
tion of appeals. It also points to larger inventories of cases remain-
ing at the end of each year. At the end of statistical year 1988, 818
cases were pending;45 at the end of 1989, 1,004 cases were un-
resolved;46 and, at the end of 1990, 1,156 cases remained. 47 Crimi-
nal appeals accounted for much of the caseload surge in the Sec-
ond Circuit in the last two years, increasing to 669 in 1989 from
the previous year's 539 and to 795 in 1990.48 Much of this increase
is attributed to appeals of sentences imposed under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 4 and appeals in cases involving controlled
substances.
Comparisons between conditions in 1891 and conditions in
1991 are inevitable. The federal courts of the nation are inundated
in 1991, as they were in 1891, with caseloads that have been in-
creasing in geometric proportions. As in 1891, the Second Circuit
continues to bear a large share of the burden. Although the causes
of today's litigation explosion may be different from those that
prevailed one hundred years ago, the issue is very much the
same-whether the federal courts are so overburdened as to call
into question their ability to provide for "the just, speedy, and in-
Circuit Court's Backlog Cut by 10 percent, N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1991, at 1.
41 U.S. COURTS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 1988, at 7 [hereinaf-
ter 1988 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT].
2 1989 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 37, at 7.
42 1990 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 36, at 7.
44 Id.
41 1988 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 41, at 4.
41 1989 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
'" 1990 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 36, at 4.
4 Id.; 1989 SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 37, at 4.
41 Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987. The effect of the more liberal provisions for
appeal of sentences under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was not felt until challenges
to the constitutionality of the Act were rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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expensive determination of every action." 50 It seems certain that
the courts of appeals of the nation are confronted with two options
as they begin their second century of existence. 1 One option is to
continue the present course, with the expectation of incremental
increases in the appellate caseload and with expansion of the ap-
pellate judiciary continually lagging behind need. The other option
is a change of course involving some adjustments in the operation
of the federal court system. Court structure, procedure, case man-
agement methods, decisional process, and subject matter jurisdic-
tion are areas in which appropriate and effective adjustments
might be made. Apparent is the need for a detailed study to iden-
tify possible alternatives in each of these areas and to point the
course for the future. In 1988, Congress directed that such a study
be undertaken.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS
Its attention somehow having been drawn to the crisis in the
federal courts that it had no small part in creating,52 and to its
responsibilities under the Constitution of the United States, 53 Con-
gress enacted the Federal Courts Study Act ("Act" or "Study
Act") on November 19, 1988, effective January 1, 1989.5 The Act
established as part of the Judicial Conference of the United
States55 "a Federal Courts Study Committee on the future of the
Federal judiciary. '56 According to the Act, the purposes of the
Committee were to inquire into issues and problems confronting
the federal courts of the nation and to develop a long-range plan
50 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
51 See Miner, Federal Courts at the Crossroads, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY 251 (1987); see
also Campbell, Into the Third Century: Views of the Appellate System from the Federal
Courts Study Committee, 74 MAss. L. REv. 292 (1989).
82 See Miner, supra note 51, at 252-54.
'3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 empowers Congress "[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to
the supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1 vests judicial power "in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."
4 Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. I, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988) [hereinafter Federal Courts
Study Act].
Il The Judicial Conference of the United States is composed of the Chief Justice of the
United States, the chief judge of each judicial circuit, the chief judge of the Court of Inter-
national Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
Through its supervision of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, it exer-
cises general administrative control over the federal court system.
56 Federal Courts Study Act, supra note 54, § 102(a).
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for the federal judiciary's future.57 Congress specifically directed
the Committee to make "assessments" of alternate dispute resolu-
tion methods, federal court system structure and administration,
methods of resolving inter- and intra-circuit conflicts in courts of
appeals, and "the types of disputes resolved by the Federal
Courts."58 The Committee was empowered to make a complete
study of the courts, with such recommendations and conclusions as
it deemed advisable, including recommendations for "revisions to
be made to laws of the United States." 9
Since the Committee was made a part of the Judicial Confer-
ence, Congress fittingly designated the Chief Justice of the United
States, who presides over the Conference, to appoint the fifteen
members of the Committee and to select one of the members as
Chairman."0 The designation of the Chief Justice also may have
served to avoid any separation of powers problems.8 The Study
Act established a time limit of fifteen months from its effective
date for the filing of the Committee Report. 2 To carry out its
functions and accomplish its purposes, the Committee was author-
ized to promulgate rules,63 to conduct hearings, 64 to request assis-
tance and information from various government departments and
agencies, 5 to establish advisory panels,66 and to expend the sum of
$300,000 for each of the fiscal years 1989 and 1990.67 Provision was
made for the Committee to dissolve sixty days after filing its
report.6 8
The Committee members appointed by the Chief Justice were,
as required by the Study Act, "representative of the various inter-
ests, needs and concerns which may be affected by the jurisdiction
of the Federal courts."69 The Committee included five federal
:7 Id. § 102(b)(1)-(2).
8 Id. § 102(b)(2)(A)-(D).
59 Id. § 105(2).
0 Id. § 103(a)-(b).
61 Cf. United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989) (rejecting argument that
establishment of United States Sentencing "Commission violates the Constitution by re-
quiring Article HI judges to share judicial power with nonjudges").
62 Federal Courts Study Act, supra note 54, § 105(1).
3 Id. § 103(d).
Id. § 104(a).
81 Id. § 104(b).
86 Id. § 104(d).
87 Id. § 108.
88 Id. § 107.
:8 Id. § 103(b).
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judges, four members of Congress, an assistant attorney general of
the United States, a former United States solicitor general, a state
judge, the general counsel of a state's Department of Public Advo-
cacy, and two attorneys in private practice.1 0 Three working sub-
committees were established by the Committee-one on Adminis-
tration, Management, and Structure; one on Role and Rela-
tionships; and one on Workload.7 1 Reporters and associate report-
ers supported each subcommittee, and various consultants and ad-
visory panels rendered assistance.
Its work coordinated by a small professional staff based at the
federal courthouse in Philadelphia, the Committee sought the
views of a wide spectrum of individuals and organizations to carry
out its mandate. Within three months after it was formed, the
Committee held hearings in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and
Pasadena.2 On December 22, 1989, the Committee distributed its
tentative recommendations and solicited comments. Responses
were received at public hearings held during January 1990 in nine
cities, including New York and Washington, D.C.73 More than 270
witnesses testified at these hearings regarding the draft recommen-
dations. At the public hearing held in Washington, D.C., "commit-
tee member Sen. Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) said the committee's
report should highlight the 'very dire need' for more judges and
should relegate suggested alternatives to a footnote.' 7 4 Fortu-
nately, the Committee did not adopt Senator Grassley's proposal.
V. ADJUSTMENTS PROPOSED
The Federal Courts Study Committee rendered its final report
on April 2, 1990. The Committee first acknowledged that its fif-
teen-month study was conducted in response "to mounting public
and professional concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay,
expense, and expansion. '75 It then modestly noted that it had
"conducted the most comprehensive examination of the federal
court system in the last half century-a period of unprecedented
70 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMITrrEE, app. B, at 193 (Apr. 2, 1990)
[hereinafter STUDY Comirrr= REPORT].
71 Id. at 31-32.
7 Id. at 32.
73 Id. at 32-33.
7 Sweeping Changes Recommended by Federal Courts Study Committee, 58 U.S.L.W
2442 (1990).
75 STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 3.
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growth and change in federal law and federal courts. 7 6 The "incre-
mental, not radical" proposals contained in the report were
designed to make a "better federal court system, not a smaller
one."77 If adopted, the proposals "would merely prevent the system
from being overwhelmed by a rapidly growing and already enor-
mous caseload; and in doing so they would preserve access to the
system for those who most need it.''78
Omitted from the Committee's proposals is any further in-
crease in the number of federal judges. The Committee specifically
concluded that the problems of the federal courts could not be
solved by the continuous and indefinite expansion of the federal
judiciary. That conclusion was supported by a finding that effec-
tive judicial performance can be assured "only if federal judges are
carefully selected from a pool of competent and eager applicants
and only if they are sufficiently few in number to feel a personal
stake in the consequences of their actions. Neither condition can
be satisfied if there are thousands of federal judges. '7 9 The Com-
mittee further found that "[elven if a highly competent federal ju-
diciary consisting of thousands of judges could be created and
maintained, the coordination of so many judges would be extraor-
dinarily difficult." 80 Noted in this regard was the fact that an in-
crease in the number of trial judges inevitably leads to an increase
in the number of appellate judges, which inevitably leads to an in-
crease in the rate of appeals "because it becomes more difficult to
predict the behavior of the appellate court." 81 Since the capacity of
the Supreme Court for review is limited, the increased volume
brought about by the expansion of the federal judiciary would
cause the High Court increasing difficulty in maintaining uniform-
ity in federal law. Even within a circuit, uniformity suffers when
there are too many judges on a court of appeals. Increasing the
number of courts so as to have fewer judges per court is no solu-
tion, since it creates the potential for an increase in intercircuit
76 Id.
77 Id. at 3-4. Although the Study Committee characterizes many of the proposals as
"not radical," there has been a mixed reaction to the proposals. See Coyle, Proposals on
Courts Debated, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 12, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
78 STUDY COMM=ITE REPORT, supra note 70, at 4. For a summary of the Study Commit-
tee's proposals, see Sweeping Changes in Federal Judiciary Urged by Federal Courts Study
Committee, 58 U.S.L.W. 2599 (1990).
71 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 7.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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conflicts and the consequent burden on the Supreme Court to re-
solve the conflicts.
How many federal judges are too many? Before the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, there were 168 circuit judges and 575
district judges (including those seated in territorial courts), a total
of 743. After the Act, there are 179 circuit judges and 636 district
judges (including those seated in territorial courts), a total of 815.
According to the Study Committee Report, "[i]t has been sug-
gested that 1,000 is the practical ceiling on the number of judges if
the Article III judiciary is to remain capable of performing its es-
sential functions without significant degradation of quality.' ' 82 Al-
though there is no magic in numbers and no formula for determin-
ing an appropriate cutoff point, it is apparent that the federal
judiciary almost has arrived at the "suggested maximum."
Many circuit judges share the opinion that the seats on their
courts fast are approaching or already have exceeded the most de-
sirable number. Of the circuit judges responding to a survey con-
ducted by the Committee, forty-eight percent considered eight to
ten judges the ideal size for a federal court of appeals and thirty-
one percent considered ten to fifteen the ideal size.8 3 With the new
seats created by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, every cir-
cuit court in the nation but one now exceeds ten, and three exceed
fifteen. The judges of the Second Circuit have shown no great en-
thusiasm for the expansion of the federal judiciary or for an in-
crease in the number of judges sitting on their court.8 4 In fact, they
have not requested the addition of any new judgeships since their
number was increased from eleven to thirteen in 1984.85
A. Court Structure
The Study Committee reviewed various alternatives for the re-
structuring of the federal appellate court system. Specifically re-
jected was the 1975 proposal by the Hruska Commission, formally
known as the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appel-
late System, 6 for the establishment of a National Court of Ap-
82 Id. at 8.
3Gallard & Wood, Survey of the United States Circuit Judges (Oct. 4, 1989), ii 2
WORKINo PAPERS, supra note 24, at 6.
:4 See id.
85 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit.
II, § 201(a), 98 Stat. 346.
88 The Commission was established by Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1972), as
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peals. The proposal envisioned a court whose decisions would have
been "binding upon the district courts, the regional courts of ap-
peals, and the state courts on questions of federal law."'8 7 This in-
termediate court, interposed between the circuit courts and the
Supreme Court, would have consisted of seven article III judges. It
would have sat only in banc and have had its headquarters in
Washington, D.C., where argument of appeals ordinarily would
have been heard. The National Court of Appeals would have exer-
cised jurisdiction by reference, "under which the Supreme Court
could refer to the National Court any case within its appellate ju-
risdiction," 88 and by transfer, "under which the regional courts of
appeals could transfer cases that would otherwise be heard by
those courts." 89 However jurisdiction was acquired, any case de-
cided by the National Court would have been subject to review by
the Supreme Court on certiorari.
The Hruska Commission concluded that a National Court of
Appeals would have been able to decide 150 cases per year and
thus double the national appellate capacity; would not have caused
undue prolongation of the appellate process; would have resulted
in four tiers of review only in rare instances; would not have been
limited to the resolution of intercircuit conflicts and thus would
have been able to provide authoritative decisions before conflicts
even arose; would have reduced the cost of litigation and brought
"greater clarity and stability to the national law, with less delay
than is often possible today."' 0 Despite the validity of some of
these conclusions, the Federal Courts Study Committee gave the
notion of a national intermediate appellate court short shrift:
"[s]uch a tribunal would enlarge the system's capacity to resolve
intercircuit conflicts, but would not solve the problem of growth
within the courts of appeals. Hence, by itself, it could resolve only
a piece of the problem." 1 The Committee did present five struc-
tural alternatives for further inquiry and discussion, without en-
amended by Pub. L. No. 93-420, 88 Stat. 1153 (1974). It was chaired by Senator Roman L.
Hruska.
87 COMM'N ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND IN-
TERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE 30 (June 1975).
8 Id. at 32.
80 Id.
90 Id. at 39. For further arguments in favor of an intermediate court of appeals, see
Safranek, Time for an Intermediate Court of Appeals: The Evidence Says "Yes", 23 IND. L.
REV. 863 (1990).
9' STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 117.
[Vol. 65:673
PLANNING FOR THE SECOND CENTURY
dorsing any one of them.
1. Multiple Circuit Appellate Courts Functioning as a Unified
Court '2
This structure contemplates a single, unified, national appel-
late court operating through regional divisions and a federal circuit
division. Appeals would come to the regional divisions from the
district courts in each region and to the federal circuit division
from the United States Claims Court and the United States Court
of International Trade. Present circuit boundaries would be re-
placed by regional boundaries, with the nation evenly divided into
regions. Nine judges would serve in each of the regional divisions.
The increased number of intercircuit-type conflicts generated by
the proliferation of panels would be handled in one of two ways: a
rule could be adopted requiring adherence to precedents estab-
lished by prior panel decisions in other divisions; or a central divi-
sion of the unified court could be established to hear and decide
conflicts among regional divisions.
2. Four-Tiered System93
In this structure, two appellate courts are interposed between
the district courts and the Supreme Court. The first appellate tier
would consist of twenty to thirty regional appellate divisions, with
nine or ten judges per division. Appeals of right from the district
courts within a designated geographical area would come to the
first-tier appellate division covering that region. The second appel-
late tier would consist of four or five tribunals located in various
areas of the nation. Each second-tier court would have seven
judges, and each would take cases on a discretionary basis from a
specified grouping of the first-tier courts. The advantage of this
structure is said to lie in the ability of the higher tribunal to estab-
lish a more coherent body of law within a system that allows all
the courts at both levels to remain small in size. The Supreme
Court would take cases only from the upper-level courts, allowing
the latter to see to the development of uniformity in the decisions
of the lower-tier courts. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit is designated as a second-tier court, with appeals taken di-
92 Id. at 118.
93 Id. at 119.
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rectly to it from the United States Claims Court and the United
States Court of International Trade.
3. National Subject-Matter Courts94
Structuring appellate courts by subject matter is not a new
concept. One such court already exists in the federal system-the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. An expansion of this con-
cept would leave in place the present regional courts of appeals but
would establish a number of subject-matter appellate courts. The
latter courts would take appeals from the district courts according
to the subject of the case on appeal. Specialized courts might be
established to hear appeals in cases involving tax, admiralty, labor,
civil rights, administrative, and criminal issues. The regional courts
would be relieved of a substantial part of their caseload, and many
areas of intercircuit conflict would be eliminated in this scenario.
In addition, specialized panels could be created within the regional
circuit courts.
4. Single, Centrally Organized Court of Appeals 95
The structure contemplated by this alternative would have all
appeals court judges as members .of a single court, assigned to sit
where needed but primarily at locations near their homes. Under
this setup, all present courts of appeals would be merged into one
centrally organized tribunal. Such a court would have the flexibil-
ity to allocate judges and resources according to need. It could es-
tablish its own precedents for the resolution of conflicts between
panels and could experiment with subject-matter courts and inter-
nal tiers.
5. Consolidation into Jumbo Circuits"
This structure calls for the consolidation of the existing courts
into five large circuits. Judges could be assigned to sit in divisions.
The large units would allow for the shifting of resources within
each jumbo circuit. Each circuit would be free to adopt its own
system for the resolution of intracircuit conflicts. Regular in banc
9, Id. at 120; see also Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Cir-
cuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a
Model, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 853 (1990).
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 121.
" Id. at 122.
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sittings, with rotating memberships, have been suggested as a
means of maintaining uniformity in jumbo circuits. The in banc
courts would be small and might act as supervisory courts in this
structure.
Various criticisms have been leveled at each one of the re-
structuring proposals. Some of this criticism arises from a simple
reluctance to change a system that has worked so well for so long.
Judge John Godbold has observed that "[t]he circuits, although ar-
tificial creations of Congress, have taken on in the ... 100 years
since 1891 rich and unique identities. '17 Support for the preserva-
tion of those identities and the traditions they represent is very
strong. Accordingly, it seems inevitable for the foreseeable future
"that changes in the number and contour of circuits on a circuit-
by-circuit basis will be few and far between." 9.8 The Study Com-
mittee itself found some deficiencies in each of the restructuring
proposals recommended for further study. The proposal for multi-
ple appellate courts functioning as a unified court was criticized as
introducing "additional delay into the litigation process."99 In a
four-tiered system, "it could be harder to attract able jurists to the
lower-tier courts." 100 A single, centrally organized court of appeals
"could have all the earmarks of a large bureaucracy, and it would
counter the salutary trend . . . toward decentralized administra-
tion."''1 Jumbo circuits are the subject of "current debate between
the Ninth Circuit and the other circuits revolv[ing] around two
very different conceptions of an appellate court." 0 2
The Ninth Circuit is, of course, the very model of a modern
jumbo circuit. It is far and away the largest regional circuit in all
respects. Its sprawling geographical area includes the states of
Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
" Godbold, Governance of the Courts and Structure of the Circuits, in FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CENTER, THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 36 (C. Harrison & R.
Wheeler ed. 1989).
0' Id. One of the ways to preserve the number and contour of the present circuits would
be to adopt a system for discretionary access to federal courts at both the trial and the
appellate levels so as to reallocate jurisdiction between the state and federal courts. The
discretion to provide access would be vested in the federal courts and would be exercised for
individual cases in designated categories. See Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction:
Proposals to Preserve the Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 770-76 (1989)
(analyzing proposal for discretionary access to federal courts).
"9 STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 10.
10 Id. at 120.
101 Id. at 121.
102 Id. at 122.
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Washington and Hawaii, as well as the territory of Guam.1 3 With
twenty-eight active judges, the Ninth Circuit is authorized eleven
more judges than is the court with the next highest number of
judges.1 04 Circuits with more than fifteen members may perform
their in banc functions by such number of their members as may
be prescribed by court rule, 05 and the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
rule providing for an in banc court to consist of ten randomly se-
lected judges and the chief judge.1 0 6 The Study Committee notes
that the Ninth Circuit "apparently manages effectively" and is
said by "some observers" to be "not unduly troubled by intracir-
cuit conflicts. '01 The Committee took no position on the recurring
question of whether the Ninth Circuit should be split, 08 observing
only that "we would let more time pass before definitively conclud-
ing that larger circuits are unworkable."' 09
The organization of courts and of panels within courts by sub-
ject matter has been the subject of discussion for some time. In
1975, three distinguished scholars, long-time observers of the fed-
eral appellate landscape, wrote: "In organizing large courts to per-
form first-level review, greater use should be made of subject mat-
ter docket assignments, generalized courts with exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction, and specialized courts with generalized
judges." 110  Despite the obvious advantages of specializa-
tion-expertise, expedition and efficiency-the subject-matter
structure is not a popular one. In the survey conducted by the
Study Committee, sixty percent of the circuit judges responding
opined that the addition of more specialized courts would be either
"undesirable" or "very undesirable.""' There is reason to believe
that the negative reaction would be even higher among the judges
of the Second Circuit.
Although it may be argued that specialization is widespread in
modern society, that subject-matter courts have operated success-
fully in continental judicial systems, and that there have been suc-
... 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988).
I" Id. § 44(a).
101 Id. § 46(c); Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633.
106 9TH CIR. R. 35-3.
107 STUDY CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 122.
108 Id. at 123; see also Baker, A Background Paper on the Circuit Boundaries of the
United States Courts of Appeals, in 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 24, at 16-25.
109 STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 122.
"o P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 230 (1976).
"I Gallard & Wood, supra note 83, at 9.
[Vol. 65:673
PLANNING FOR THE SECOND CENTURY
cessful specialized courts in America, the arguments have not
proved persuasive to the bench and bar. The Study Committee has
recognized "that most American lawyers find the idea of special-
ized courts repugnant. ' 112 The Committee itself finds a number of
problems inherent in the specialized structure: "the danger of tun-
nel vision, the danger of 'capture'... by the interest group most
concerned with [the] court's specialty, the danger of political im-
balance . . ., the problem of the case that raises issues within the
purview of more than one specialized court, the danger of prema-
ture suppression of diverse views. ' 113 Beyond these problems and
disadvantages, the Committee foresees the possibility of an extra
tier of appellate review-a supreme specialized court below the Su-
preme Court to resolve conflicts among the regional specialized
courts.
The Study Committee specifically rejected proposals for one
type of specialized court, apparently deeming it even unworthy of
further study-an article III court of administrative appeals hav-
ing exclusive jurisdiction to review all federal administrative
agency orders. The rejection was grounded on concern that such a
court could not be administered effectively because of its size.
While 2,618 administrative agency cases came directly to the fed-
eral courts of appeals in 1990 (206 to the Second Circuit), 1 4 hardly
unmanageable numbers, many more administrative cases are filed
in the district courts each year. It is estimated that there are five
to eight times as many such cases filed in the district courts as in
the circuit courts. Accordingly, a large, multidivisional court would
be required, causing the Committee to conclude that "[t]he gains
of such centralization are not worth these costs."' 5 Although much
work in the administrative law area already is concentrated in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Commit-
tee rejected a proposal to designate that court as the specialized
administrative court. Also rejected was a proposal to authorize the
D.C. Circuit to sit in banc to review the administrative decisions of
other circuits. Either proposal would result in a greatly enlarged
court, and the latter proposal would establish an extra tier of re-
view, with "only incremental gains in uniformity." '
112 STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 11.
113 Id.
114 WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 20.
"' STUDY COMMrrrEE REPoRT, supra note 70, at 73.
116 Id.
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As part of the Committee Report, four members filed an "ad-
ditional statement" expressing their concern "at the possibility
that the committee's identification of several radical models for al-
ternative court structures will be misinterpreted by observers as
tacit approval of one or some of them" as well as their "hope that
their presentation here for further study does not lend them a le-
gitimacy to which they are not yet entitled."'17 While the four
members making the separate statement did not oppose the Com-
mittee's recommendations for further study of alternative struc-
tures, they did identify a number of matters that they felt should
be given priority: analysis of pro se filings to determine whether
they have inflated the caseloads of the appellate courts; improved
case management techniques; and the length of appeals court opin-
ions. They complained that insufficient attention was given to less
radical measures. Their complaint is not well-founded, however, -
because the Committee does support less radical measures, includ-
ing procedural adjustments.
B. Procedure
The Federal Courts Study Committee suggests a number of
changes in district court procedure. Some of these changes would,
of course, lessen the flow of cases to the courts of appeals and will
therefore be examined briefly in this section. As to adjustments in
appellate procedure, the Committee made some recommendations
in the area of the decisional process, which will be examined in the
next section. Beyond that, the only recommendations on the sub-
ject of appellate procedure were that "serious attention" be given
to the subject "over the next five years" and that a study be under-
taken to determine the feasibility of establishing a discretionary
review procedure in the courts of appeals." 8 Discretionary review
would enable the circuits to control their dockets through a device
similar to the writ of certiorari employed by the Supreme Court.11 9
The Committee observed that such a procedure has been adopted
in several states and in the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals. Some commentators have concluded that, as long as an ap-
pellate court having discretionary review is committed to the error-
11 Id. at 124.
118 Id. at 116.
119 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1988) (Supreme Court reviews cases from courts of appeals by
writ of certiorari and certification of question).
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correcting as well as the lawmaking function, there is not much
real difference between denial of review and summary
affirmance. 12
0
Despite the call for further study, the report identifies more
negatives than positives in the proposals for discretionary review.
Emphasis is placed on the time and effort required for a compre-
hensive examination of the record to serve the error-correcting
function. Such time and effort could just as well be expended in
arriving at a summary disposition after full submission of the ap-
peal. The report notes the possibility of combining certiorari-type
review in the courts of appeals with first instance review by a panel
of two or three district judges acting as an appellate division in the
district court. The Supreme Court never has held that there is a
right to an appeal, but it has required that the procedures used in
handling appeals must comply with the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Constitution whenever appeals are pro-
vided. 121 At present, one appeal as of right is afforded to litigants
in almost every state court system as well as in the federal system.
The Committee acknowledges that changing to a discretionary re-
view procedure for a first appeal "would be a major departure from
our tradition. ' 122 Yet, fifty-nine percent of the circuit judges re-
sponding to the Committee's question-"If caseload increases,
would you favor eliminating appeal as of right, and accepting ap-
peals only by leave of court?"-answered "yes.' 123
The Second Circuit utilizes a modified form of discretionary
review that has proved to be quite successful. In the case of pro se
motions by state prisoners for certificates of probable cause in
habeas corpus cases, 24 and by prisoners and others for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis,"' and for the appointment of coun-
sel,126 the practice is for the court to notify movants that not only
120 See Lanza, Discretionary Review, in 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 24, at 12 &
n.20.
121 See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985).
122 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 116.
123 Gallard & Wood, supra note 83, at 9.
1'4 See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b).
125 See id. rule 24(a). Some courts have adopted a rule requiring payment of a portion
of the filing fee in an effort to ensure the good faith of prisoners challenging the conditions
of confinement. See T.E. WILLGING, PARTIAL PAYMENT OF FILING FEES IN PRISONER IN FORMA
PAUPERIS CASES IN FEDERAL COURTS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (Federal Judicial Center 1984).
But see In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 965 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Congress has permitted indigent
persons to bring lawsuits... without prepayment of filing fees").
12I See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
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may these motions be denied, but the appeals may be dismissed at
the same time. The motions in effect bring the merits of the ap-
peals up for preliminary review. Most of the cases in which these
appeals are pursued involve challenges to state convictions, 27 state
prison conditions of confinement, 12 8 federal sentences, 2 9 and fed-
eral prison conditions.130 Each pro se application is scrutinized by
staff clerks, who forward their recommendations, along with the
moving papers and pertinent parts of the record, to a three-judge
motions panel.131 The applications are reviewed, without briefing
or oral argument, by the panel, which dismisses frivolous or mali-
cious appeals without further ado. 3 2 Appeals considered to have
merit are returned to the regular calendar, with appropriate rul-
ings on the motions, for full briefing. Five hundred and eighty-
eight prisoners' appeals were filed in the Second Circuit in 1990,133
and it is estimated that a large number of these were disposed of
through the truncated procedure described. This procedure has re-
sulted in considerable savings in time and effort and is an impor-
tant factor in the expeditious processing of appeals in the Second
Circuit.
One of the most important procedural adjustments recom-
mended by the Committee is the expanded use of alternate dispute
resolution ("ADR") mechanisms. The legislation creating the
Study Committee specifically directed the assessment of ADR
methods, ' 3  and the Committee devoted considerable attention to
the subject. The use of ADR by the courts as a means of alleviating
the caseload burden has been growing for some time. Rule 16(c)(7)
127 See id. § 2254.
'z' See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991).
129 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
130 See Fisher v. Koehler, 902 F.2d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1990) (class action by prison inmates
against prison officials alleging prison conditions violated eighth amendment).
2D CIR. R. 27(b).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). A very recent innovation in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals is the sua sponte calendar, prepared by the clerk and forwarded to a regular panel.
This procedure allows sua sponte dismissal of cases in which represented parties appeal
from non-appealable orders. Whether this procedure will be extended to frivolous appeals is
an open question.
Another means of discouraging frivolous appeals is by the use of the sanctioning pro-
cess, at both the district court level and the appellate level. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11; FED. R.
APP. P. 38; 28 U.S.C. § 1912; see also T.E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS
(Federal Judicial Center 1988); Kaufman, Safeguarding Judicial Resources: The Joint Duty
of Bench and Bar, 52 BROOKLYN L. REv. 579, 582-586 (1986).
133 1990 SECOND Ciacurr REPORT, supra note 36, at 4.
"4 See Federal Courts Study Act, supra note 54, § 102(b)(2)(A).
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the partici-
pants at any pretrial conference "may consider and take action
with respect to ... the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute." 135 Among the extrajudicial procedures to which the
courts have directed litigants are summary jury trials, in which
counsel present to a jury only designated exhibits and their own
arguments as to anticipated evidence; 36 mediation, in which court-
appointed mediators endeavor to induce the parties to settle;13 7
mini-trials, where each side's case is presented before the parties
themselves in an effort to provoke settlement;"38 and court-an-
nexed arbitration. 39 Whether a district court may invoke rule 16
to require the use of one or more ADR devices is at least
questionable. 40
Congress has enacted legislation providing for court-annexed
arbitration ("CAA") in ten specified district courts, including the
Eastern District of New York in the Second Circuit.14" The same
legislation authorized CAA in ten additional districts to be desig-
nated by the Judicial Conference of the United States and directed
that the Federal Judicial Center prepare a report on the effective-
ness of CAA programs in the districts in which they are used. 42
The Study Committee recommends that Congress eliminate any
doubt that ADR mechanisms may be adopted by local rule by en-
acting appropriate enabling legislation.143 However, the Committee
FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)(7).
18 See M. JACOUBOVITCH & C. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE NORTHERN Dis-
TRIct OF OHIO (Federal Judicial Center 1982).
"7 See K. SHUART, THE WAYNE COUNTY MEDIATION PROGRAM IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF MICHIGAN (Federal Judicial Center 1984); K. TEGLAND, MEDIATION IN THE WESTERN Dis-
TRICT OF WASHINGTON (Federal Judicial Center 1984).
138 See Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, 9 LrrIG. 12, 18 (Fall 1982) ("key point is that
the mini-trial is nothing more than a carefully structured settlement proposal").
139 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 39-40 (1984); E.A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBI-
TRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1981); Nejelski & Ray,
Alternatives to Court and Trial, in THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
263 (F. Klein ed. 1981).
1o See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-88 (7th Cir. 1987) (federal dis-
trict court may not force parties to participate in summary jury trial).
141 28 U.S.C. §§ 651(a), 658(1) (1988).
142 See id. § 658(2). Two of those districts are the Western and Northern Districts of
New York.
143 STUDY COMMITSE REPORT, supra note 70, at 83. The benefit of ADR and other
methods designed to expedite and reduce the expense of litigation is discussed in Rowe,
American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way". Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 886-902 (background paper illustrating possible uses
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would not require the adoption of specific ADR rules by any court,
allowing local conditions to dictate which, if any, ADR techniques
should be adopted. Decisions about permissible cost and fee incen-
tives-the imposition of costs and fees upon those who reject ADR
awards or fail to improve upon them after trial-should be left to
Congress, in the Committee's view.14 4 Also recommended is author-
ization and funding "for sustained experimentation with alterna-
tive and supplementary techniques," subject to appropriate guide-
lines.145 Most interesting, and relevant to the plans of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, is the Committee's suggestion that ADR
mechanisms should be available to supplement appellate as well as
trial procedures.1 46
Recognized by the Committee is the serious concern of many
"that ADR techniques may be perceived to promote a system of
second-class justice, whereby litigants with modest resources are
...shunted aside to inferior alternative procedures. 147 Participa-
tion by the public, the bar, and ADR professionals in the develop-
ment of appropriate legislation and rules all are seen as a means of
dispelling the perception, which may be groundless in any event.
There is in fact good reason to believe that "litigants like ADR and
think it produces fair outcomes."' 4 8 However true this may be, it
appears that ADR mechanisms are not widely invoked by judges.
The Standing Committee on the Improvement of Civil Litigation
of the Second Circuit Judicial Council reported the following: "De-
spite the effectiveness of ... ADR procedures in appropriate cases,
few trial judges in this Circuit have used them or recommended
their use to litigants .... [T]he reluctance of most judges seems to
be based on ... their lack of experience or familiarity with such
procedures.' 14 e
Among the district courts in the Second Circuit, the District of
and misuses of ADR). For an early study of court-annexed arbitration, see E.A. LIND & J.
SHAPARD, supra note 139.
144 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 84.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 83.
147 Id. at 84.
'" Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the
Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 29 (1990).
049 STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF CIVIL LITIGATION, SETTLEMENT PRAC-
TICES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 76 (Oct. 13, 1988) [hereinafter STrLEMENT PRACTICES] The
Standing Committee on the Improvement of Civil Litigation is a committee of the Judicial
Council of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Connecticut has adopted a Special Masters Program, the Eastern
District has adopted mandatory court-annexed arbitration, and the
Southern District employs a voluntary ADR technique involving
reference to the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). The
Connecticut procedure calls for the appointment of two attorneys
as special masters to conduct a settlement conference in each case,
review settlement memoranda, and file a conference report with
the court.1 °0 Apparently, fifty percent of all cases referred to spe-
cial masters under this procedure are settled.151
The Eastern District Arbitration Plan is compulsory for all
civil cases, except social security and prisoners' rights cases, in
which money damages do not exceed $100,000, exclusive of interest
and costs.152 Attorney-arbitrators sit in panels of three, and judg-
ment is entered upon their award unless trial de novo is demanded
within thirty days following entry of the award.53 An amount
equal to the fees of the arbitrators is deposited if trial is demanded
(except for litigants proceeding in forma pauperis), to be returned
only if a judgment more favorable than the award is obtained.15 4
This procedure has had a success record of over forty percent.155
The Southern District procedure requires only that the parties at-
tend a conference conducted by the AAA, if ordered to do so by
the court, "to explore resolution of [the] dispute by arbitration,
mediation or other method of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR)."156 If the parties choose arbitration, they must execute a
stipulation agreeing to that method of dispute resolution and con-
senting to the dismissal of the action. Apparently, because of the
voluntary nature of this procedure, fewer cases have been
processed for ADR in the Southern District than in the Eastern
District. In the entire period from 1984 to 1990, only thirteen
judges had referred 162 cases to the ADR program in the Southern
District, with a disposal rate of thirty-eight percent.1 57 Whatever
50 D.C. CONN. R. 28(d).
151 SLTTEMENT PRACTICES, supra note 149, at 32.
1.. Id. at 23.
153 Id. at 25-26.
1" Id. at app. E, Eastern District of New York Exhibit A (Local Arbitration Rule §
7(d)).
'11 Id. at 26.
111 Id. at app. E, Southern District of New York (memorandum to counsel for the
parties).
'15 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK 30.
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its success rate in the district courts of the Second Circuit, ADR
has lessened the flow of cases to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, and, with greater understanding of its potential by the
bench and bar, promises to be an even greater factor in "averting
the flood' 15 8 in the future.
Other recommendations made by the Study Committee that
would stem the flow to the courts of appeals involve the adoption
of new procedures to create additional capacity within the judicial
branch. One such recommendation relates to the system of tax liti-
gation; another pertains to appeals in bankruptcy cases; and a
third deals with the processing of claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. Finding "irrational" the present system of federal tax
adjudication-the option to pay the tax and sue for refund in the
district court or in the Claims Court; or to decline to pay and con-
test the deficiency in the Tax Court-the Committee would create
"an Article III appellate division of the United States Tax Court
with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in federal income, estate,
and gift taxes," with the initial tax litigation conducted before arti-
cle I judges in a Tax Court trial division as at present.' 59 Four
members of the Committee dissented from this proposal, noting
the effective blending of the specialist and generalist qualities in
the present system, the danger of centralizing substantive tax dis-
putes, the satisfactory operation of present procedures, and wide-
spread opposition to the proposal. 160 It appears to this author that
the procedure proposed by the Committee would effect very mini-
mal changes in the caseloads of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, where petitions to review tax court decisions and appeals
from the district court in tax refund cases are few in number.
Section 158(b) of title 28 of the United States Code allows the
judicial council of a circuit to establish a bankruptcy appellate
panel, consisting of three bankruptcy judges, to review the deci-
sions of bankruptcy judges. The review must be by consent of all
parties and the district judges for the district must authorize the
procedure. Where these panels are established, their decisions are
reviewed by the courts of appeals.'' Except for two circuits in
188 Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 634
(1974).
'89 STUDY CoMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 69.
..0 Id. at 71-72.
101 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (d) (1988).
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which the system has been adopted,16 2 the appellate route contin-
ues to be: bankruptcy court to district court to court of appeals.
The Study Committee would establish bankruptcy panels in each
circuit, with the right afforded to the parties to opt out of the pro-
cedure; appeals to the circuit courts from the appellate panels
would be limited to constitutional issues and questions of law.163
Three Committee members dissented from the recommendation,
citing the heavy caseloads now borne by bankruptcy judges (who
would staff the panels) and the weakening of the ability of the dis-
trict courts to oversee the work of the bankruptcy courts."" The
Second Circuit has declined to establish bankruptcy appellate
panels under the present system and is unlikely to do so in the
foreseeable future, a manageable number of 104 appeals to the
Second Circuit in bankruptcy matters having been filed in 1990.165
Even less likely is Second Circuit support for the procedure recom-
mended by the Study Committee.
The small claims procedure suggested by the Study Commit-
tee is worthy of consideration by the Second Circuit because it
provides a fairly simple and effective means of lessening the
caseflow while simplifying matters for litigants. It requires Con-
gress to "establish a $10,000 minimum jurisdictional amount for
federal tort claims ... and establish a small-claims procedure for
claims below the minimum." 6 ' The Federal Tort Claims Act al-
lows suits against the United States for the torts of its employees
with no minimum limits, and local tort law is applied in adjudicat-
ing those claims. 1 7 The small claims cases could be heard by an
independent tribunal, a tribunal established in the Justice Depart-
ment or in the agency against which the claim is made, the United
States Claims Court, or in district court divisions administered by
magistrates. 168 It seems apparent that the Study Committee is con-
vinced that its recommendations for procedural adjustments have
more potential for enhancing the operation of the federal court
162 See STUDY CoMuITrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 74 (First and Ninth Circuits have
established bankruptcy panels).
163 Id. at 74-75.
:64 Id. at 76.
165 WORKLOAD STATISTiCS, supra note 29, at 20. Bankruptcy court filings in the Second
Circuit totalled 36,327 in 1990, representing an increase of 40% over 1989. Bankruptcies
Rise Dramatically in East, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 8, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
166 STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 81.
167 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
5 STUDY CoMIrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 81.
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system than further improvements in case management tech-
niques.
C. Case Management
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals long has been at the
forefront in the development of innovations for court management.
Those innovations, combined with the hard work of each of the
judges, have enabled the court to keep current in its work over a
period of many years. One of the case management techniques that
originated in the Second Circuit is the Civil Appeals Management
Plan ("CAMP"), which has been held up as a model for other cir-
cuits. 169 CAMP is designed to encourage the settlement of cases on
appeal before argument, to narrow the issues for appeal, and to
expedite the appeals process. CAMP works this way: Within ten
days after filing the notice of appeal or petition for review or en-
forcement, the appellant or petitioner must file a civil appeal
preargument statement along with an order for the transcript and
copies of the judgment, order, or decision appealed from. 170 There-
after, one of the two staff counsel, who devote their full time to
CAMP matters, may direct the attorneys to attend a preargument
conference to explore settlement possibilities, simplify the issues,
or discuss any matters related to the expeditious disposition of the
appeal. 71 Guidelines for the conduct of preargument conferences
have been adopted and provide, among other things, for good faith
participation by attorneys and, in some cases, their clients.1 2 Con-
ference discussions are confidential and may not be disclosed to
any member of the court. 73 As soon as practicable, staff counsel
IGO See Partridge & Lind, A Reevaluation of the Civil Appeals Management Plan, in
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS (M. Tonry & R.A. Katz-
man ed. 1988); Kaufman, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Man-
agement Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755, 755-57 (1986). For further information on CAMP in addi-
tion to a discussion of various proposals for other procedural adjustments and structural
alternatives in federal appeals courts, see A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL
IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PRO-
CESS AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWTH (1989). For a discussion of the technique used by the
Sixth Circuit, see J. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIR-
CUIT COURT OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1990). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
now is planning a program patterned after the Sixth Circuit plan. Mediation Plan Set, Nat'l
L.J., Apr. 8, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
170 CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN rule 3, in 2D CIR. R. [hereinafter C.A.M.P. R.].
71 C.A.M.P. R. 5.
172 See GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCT OF PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE, in 2D CIR. R.
173 Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir.
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will issue a scheduling order setting forth dates for the filing of the
record on appeal, briefs and appendix, and designating the week
during which the argument of the appeal will be heard. 17 4 The
dates prescribed by the scheduling order do not necessarily con-
form to the filing dates set forth in the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.175 In 1989, the CAMP program was responsible for the
disposition of 601 cases without briefs or appellate argument, a
number representing nearly twenty percent of the total appeals
terminated in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 7 6
The management of criminal appeals in the Second Circuit is
governed by the Revised Second Circuit Plan to Expedite the
Processing of Criminal Appeals. In the case of any defendant
found guilty after trial, the district judge must complete and trans-
mit to the district court clerk for transmittal to the court of ap-
peals a form containing the following information: sentencing data;
whether any transcripts were ordered during trial; whether defend-
ant is eligible for appointment of counsel on appeal pursuant to
the Criminal Justice Act; 77 whether there is any reason why trial
counsel should not be continued on appeal; and whether the trial
minutes should be transcribed at the government's expense. 17 8 At
the time the notice of appeal is filed, counsel for the appellant
must furnish a form certifying that the transcript has been ordered
and satisfactory arrangements have been made for the payment of
its cost.17 9 When a transcript has been ordered, the court reporter
must notify the clerk of the court of appeals "immediately" of the
estimated length of the transcript and the estimated date of com-
pletion; the time for completion "shall not exceed 30 days from the
order date except under unusual circumstances which first must be
approved by the Court of Appeals upon a showing of need." 180
As soon as possible after the notice of appeal is filed in a crim-
inal case, a scheduling order is issued in the court of appeals pro-
viding that the record on appeal be docketed within twenty days
after filing of the notice of appeal; that the appellant's brief and
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980).
174 C.A.M.P. R. 4.
11 See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 31(a) (designating time for serving and filing briefs).
176 Kaufman, supra note 148, at 11.
177 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988).
178 REVISED SECOND CIRCUIT PLAN TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESSING OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
rule 1, in 2D Cut. R.
179 Id. rule 3.
1* Id. rule 4.
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appendix be filed not later than thirty days after the date on which
the transcript is scheduled to be filed, unless a longer or shorter
period is established for good cause shown; that the appellee's brief
be filed not later than thirty days after the date on which appel-
lant's brief and appendix are scheduled to be filed, unless a differ-
ent period is fixed for good cause; and that the argument will be
heard during the week designated in the scheduling order.181 The
court of appeals may enter any other order deemed necessary for
the prompt disposition of appeals, including: appointing counsel on
appeals; setting a date for filing transcriptions of trial minutes; re-
quiring attorneys for co-appellants to share a copy of the tran-
script; and instructing the clerk to permit counsel to remove and
examine the record.'82 Strict adherence to the scheduling require-
ments provided has enabled the Revised Second Circuit Plan to
Expedite the Processing of Criminal Appeals to play an important
role in case management in the Second Circuit.' 83
The courts of appeals have been flexible and resourceful in re-
gard to new case management techniques. Yet, the Study Commit-
tee seems reluctant to concede that much more benefit will be de-
rived from experimenting with new approaches to case man-
agement: "Although we believe that per judge productivity is close
to the maximum, and that further acceptable efforts to enhance
productivity will yield sharply diminishing returns, some benefits
may still come from additional case management innovations."'8
The Committee does at least recommend that the Judicial Confer-
ence conduct a study of the most effective techniques for managing
cases and provide a means for courts regularly to exchange infor-
mation, experience, and ideas in this area. The Study Committee
Report offers the following possibilities: an appellate commissioner
program utilized in the Washington Supreme Court; a computer-
ized system of issue classification being tried in the Ninth Circuit;
experimentation with two-judge panels; and the use of settlement
and case-expediting programs already in place in some of the cir-
cuits.' 85 It seems to this author that the Committee was too pessi-
181 Id. rule 5.
182 Id. rule 6.
113 See Flanagan, The Central Legal Staff and the Revised Plan to Expedite the
Processing of Criminal Appeals: Unheralded Aspects of the Second Circuit's Proud Tradi-
tion of Excellence, in FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, DISTINCTIVE PRACTICS OF THE SECOND CIRcurr
161 (1989).
184 STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 115.
185 Id. at 115-16.
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mistic about the ability of the courts to develop new and innova-
tive case management techniques and to apply old ones not yet
employed in particular circuits. Experimentation and research in
court administration is ongoing and should be encouraged.186
There yet is sufficient flexibility in the system to accommodate
new ideas in this area.
Despite the speed of its dispositions, 187 the judges of the Sec-
ond Circuit recently became concerned with the court's newly
found shortfall-its inability to dispose as many appeals as were
filed in 1989 and 1990.188 Accordingly, Chief Judge James L. Oakes
in October 1990 appointed a three-judge committee to study long-
and short-term solutions to the sharp increases in the number of
appeals filed and in the consequent shortfall.89 The committee
was charged with the task of considering such alternatives as the
screening of cases to reduce oral argument and seeking additional
judges. The committee's temporary solution, additional sitting
days for each judge, combined with a slight drop in filings, seems
to have resolved the problem for the moment. e0 The Second Cir-
cuit is the only circuit that still does not use a case management
technique that involves the screening of cases to eliminate oral ar-
gument wheie certain conditions are met. The Second Circuit has
resisted the implementation of such a case management technique
because of the circuit's deeply-rooted tradition of oral argument.
Oral argument remains available to all who seek it, except in the
cases of incarcerated prisoners who seek to argue pro se, manda-
mus applications, and criminal appeals where an Anders"'1 brief is
188 See Miner, Research in Judicial Administration: A Judge's Perspective, 12 JUST.
SYST. J. 8, 14 (1987); see also ADVIsoRY CoMMITTEE ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, EXPERiMENTATION IN THE LAW 1-6 (1981) (discussing role of experi-
mentation in American Justice System). The Chief Justice established a Judicial Conference
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management in September 1990 to assess the
need for changes in court management and administration. See Parker, Working for Im-
proved Case Management in the Federal Courts, 23 THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1991, at 6.
187 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. One of the important case manage-
ment techniques of the Second Circuit is "a flexible calendar policy that includes adding
extra cases to established panels and adding new panels if needed." 1990 SECOND Cmcurr
REPORT, supra note 36, at 7.
18 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1990, at 1.
1 See United States v. Delia, 925 F.2d 574, 575 (2d Cir. 1991) (adjustments for filing
briefs and oral arguments are disfavored due to volume undertaken by each judge as result
of additional panel assignments); cf. Wise, Circuit Court's Backlog Cut by 10 Percent,
N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1991, at 1, col. 3.
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (allowing counsel to be relieved upon sub-
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filed by an attorney seeking to be relieved from representation. Ar-
gument times have been reduced to ten or fifteen minutes per side,
except in multiparty cases involving complex issues.
The screening process, effectively used elsewhere, may yet
need to be employed in the Second Circuit. There are many varia-
tions in the methods utilized for screening cases for decision with-
out oral argument.19 This author has favored screening as a means
of providing more time for the argument of the more significant
cases, but those holding this view are in the minority in the Second
Circuit. Those who contend that oral argument should be retained
point to the bureaucratizing effect of the nonargument system as
well as the importance of the perception that each litigant have a
day in court.193 The importance of appellate argument cannot be
minimized. Of the circuit judges responding to questions posed by
the Study Committee regarding oral argument, eighty-eight per-
cent found oral argument either "very helpful" or "often helpful,"
and seventy-nine percent said their minds were changed either
"often" or "sometimes.'1 94 Yet, it is important to note that the
overwhelming number of responses to these questions came from
circuits where easily-decided cases are screened out of the argu-
ment process.
This author has suggested to his colleagues that the Federal
Judicial Center assist in a study of the situation in the Second Cir-
cuit with a view toward recommending a screening system that
would be the most suitable for the needs of the court.'95 One sys-
tem that might be effective requires staff attorney identification of
nonargument cases in the first instance. The cases so identified
would be referred to nonargument panels for disposition. Any
judge on the disposition panel could require any case so referred to
mission of appropriate brief referring to anything that might arguably support appeal).
192 See generally J. CECIL & D. STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT- A
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEDURES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1985); DE-
CIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal
Judicial Center 1987) (same authors); THE ROLE OF STAFF ATTORNEYS AND FACE-TO-FACE
CONFERENCING IN NON-ARGUMENT DECISIONMAKING (Federal Judicial Center 1989) (same
authors).
193 See Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 297, 303-07 (1986).
194 Gallard & Wood, supra note 83, at 12.
1 9 See S. FLANDERS & J. GOLDMAN, SCREENING PRACTICES AND THE USE OF PARA-JUDI-
CIAL PERSONNEL IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS: A STUDY IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT (Federal
Judicial Center 1974), reprinted in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING APPEALS IN FED-
ERAL COURTS 641 (M. Tonry & R.A. Katzman ed. 1988).
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be placed on the argument calendar. This author also has proposed
that criminal cases in which only sentencing issues are raised be
processed through the staff attorneys, who could forward them to a
designated panel for disposition without oral argument. The sen-
tencing jurisprudence is quite advanced in the Second Circuit, the
court having considered a large number of sentencing cases since
the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.196 The
Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") 197 generated by the Sentenc-
ing Commission created by the 1984 Act were subject to much crit-
icism by the judges testifying before the Study Committee, not
only for the extra time now needed for sentencing hearings, but
also because of the rigidity and adverse effects of guideline sen-
tencing on plea negotiations.19 ' The Study Committee endorsed no
policy regarding changes in the Guidelines system but did "en-
dorse serious consideration" of proposals that the Guidelines not
be treated as compulsory rules but as general standards.""9 Three
dissenters bluntly stated that "[tihe federal sentencing guidelines
are not working,"200 and gave a number of reasons for the state-
ment, the paramount reason being the impact on caseloads and the
unfairness of the system. The dissenters noted in particular that
"appeals of sentencing decisions, an insignificant percent of the ap-
peliate caseload prior to November 1, 1987, now amount to a sig-
nificant part of the appellate courts' caseload. ' 201 Criticism of the
Guidelines by the bar, for reasons unrelated to case management,
is widespread.20 2
This author long has advocated the elimination of the "Ameri-
can Rule" requiring the payment of attorneys fees by the litigant
incurring those fees, in favor of the "English Rule" requiring the
losing party to reimburse the winning party for the fees incurred in
the litigation.03 The English Rule would be applied in both trials
and appeals and would not only serve the purposes of effective case
management but also the purposes of simple fairness. It would re-
199 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
197 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUMELINES MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
198 STUDY CoMmirTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 136-39.
199 Id. at 135-36.
200 Id. at 141.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Rakoff, An Attack on Sentencing Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1990, at 3,
col. 3 (Guidelines unfair because they do not permit judges to consider individual circum-
stances of "superficially similar crimes or criminals").
1o3 See Miner, supra note 51, at 257.
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place the modest fee-shifting provision of rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure0 4 and the various specific fee-shifting
statutes that have been enacted on a piecemeal basis.20 5 The ques-
tion of where the responsibility for payment of fees should rest still
is open to debate and, according to a Federal Judicial Center sur-
vey of five possible answers to the question, "[i]t remains difficult
to distill ... any simple conclusions about which attorney fee rule
is likely to best facilitate settlement.... 2 06 The Study Committee
specifically rejects "a general rule making losing parties fully liable
for the winners' reasonable attorney fees [as] a radical measure
that would be inconsistent with traditional American attitudes to-
ward access to courts. 20 7 In somewhat of a turnabout, however,
the Committee acknowledges "possible benefits" in modifying the
American Rule for "specific problems" and opines that "attorney
fee-shifting may be appropriate in some circumstances such as dis-
covery motions and in business litigation."208
An important case management device that has been in use in
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for some time is the sixty-day
list.20 9 The list is comprised of all cases remaining undecided for a
period of sixty days from the date of oral argument. The list is
reviewed at the bimonthly meetings of the court, and the judge
assigned as author is required to report on the status of his or her
opinion.21 0 The presiding judge of the panel that heard the case
renders the report of the status of opinions assigned to a visiting or
senior judge. All that is required is an oral status report-whether
the opinion has been filed within the past few days, whether it is in
circulation, or when it is expected to be completed. As one district
judge said to this author: "Now, that's peer pressure!" In the same
vein, it is a long-time tradition in the Second Circuit for a judge
204 FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
205 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988) (court has discretion to award reasonable attor-
neys' fees to prevailing party in civil rights cases); 42 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988) (same).
'06 J. SHAPARD, THE INFLUENCE OF RULES RESPECTING RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES ON
SETTLEMENT OF CIVrI CASES 45 (Federal Judicial Center 1984); see also A.J. ToMKINS & T.E.
WILLGING, TAXATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES: PRACTICES IN ENGLISH, ALASKAN, AND FEDERAL
COURTS (Federal Judicial Center 1986). See generally Donohue, Opting for the British Rule,
or if Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 1093 (1991) (discussing various theories of rules on recovery of attorneys' fees and their
failings).
207 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 105.
208 Id.
:09 See Feinberg, supra note 193, at 313.
2 0 See J. MORRIS, FEDERAL JUSTICE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 194 (1987).
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who receives a colleague's draft opinion to put aside whatever he or
she is doing to give attention to the draft. Delay in the filing of
opinions thus is avoided to the greatest extent possible.
The Study Committee Report gives a much greater degree of
attention to matters of case management in the district court than
it does to management in the courts of appeals. With respect to
civil case management in the district courts, the Committee recom-
mended "(1) early judicial involvement to control the pace and
cost of litigation..., (2) phased discovery, (3) use of locally devel-
oped case management plans, and (4) additional training of judges
in appropriate techniques of case management." '11 Federal judges
long have been aware of the advantages of early judicial involve-
ment through the use of scheduling orders.2 12 The Committee also
urged judges to take advantage of the rule permitting oral findings
of fact and conclusions of law in civil bench trials as a means of
effective case management.21
On the criminal side, the Study Committee recommended fur-
ther study of discovery issues in criminal cases and suggested that
"[t]he Attorney General should convene a conference of prosecu-
tors and defense lawyers to consider the problems of complex
criminal trials. '214 Noted was the fact that the number of criminal
trials lasting over forty days has quadrupled since 1979.215 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals already has taken steps to deal
with the multi-defendant, multi-count, multi-issue criminal trial.
In United States v. Casamento,2 6 the Second Circuit held that in
cases where the trial is expected to last in excess of four months,
the prosecutor must present a reasoned basis to support the con-
clusion that a joint trial of all defendants is more consistent with
the fair administration of justice than some manageable division
into separate groups of defendants. 217 Although the Second Circuit
rule may result in more criminal trials, it does not for that reason
make for ineffective case management. On the contrary, it serves
the cause of effective management by saving time for lawyers,
judges, and criminal defendants, avoiding problems with jury ser-
211 STUDY CoMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 99.
212 See S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES
DISTRICr COURTS (1977).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also STUDY COMmIrrTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 102.
z" STUDY CommnIrTE REPORT, supra note 70, at 106.
211 Id. at 107.
218 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989).
17 Id. at 1152; see also United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1991).
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vice encountered in lengthy trials, and reducing the possibility of
error.
The massive caseloads generated by asbestos litigation in re-
cent years have presented unique case management problems for
district courts and courts of appeals in the Second Circuit and
elsewhere. During the statistical year ending June 30, 1990, an av-
erage of 1,140 asbestos cases were filed each month, with the accu-
mulated national backlog for the year totaling 30,401, a 20% in-
crease in backlog over the previous year.2 18 Various proposals for
the management of these cases have been advanced,219 but the
sheer mass of cases remains overwhelming. A committee appointed
by the Chief Justice of the United States has recommended that
Congress adopt specific legislation to deal with asbestos litigation,
but there seems to be little hope that any action will be taken.220
In the Second Circuit, state and federal judges have been working
together in a joint attempt to manage asbestos litigation, and, in
one instance, a settlement master has been appointed under joint
federal-state auspices.2 2' The overall asbestos litigation is but one
aspect of a larger problem-the management of multiforum, mul-
tiparty litigation involving related claims in federal and state
courts. The Study Committee has recommended that Congress
amend the multidistrict litigation statute222 to permit consolidated
trials, as well as consolidated pretrial proceedings, based on mini-
mal diversity jurisdiction.223 For now, the Judicial Panel on Multi-
District Litigation is giving its attention to the issue of pretrial
218 Labaton, Judges Struggle to Control a Caseload Crisis, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1991,
at D4, col. 4; Judges See a Crisis in Heavy Backlog of Asbestos Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6,
1991, at Al, col. 3 (same author).
210 See, e.g., T. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2 (Federal Judicial Center
1987) (discussing "special [managerial] treatments [courts have] formulated to respond to
the unique features of asbestos litigation").
220 See Labaton, Judges Struggle to Control a Caseload Crisis, supra note 218. See
generally SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON
ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Mar. 1991).
221 Wise, Joint Federal-State Trial of Asbestos Cases Scrapped, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13,
1990, at 1; Asbestos Cases Sent to a Special Master: More is Aimed at Settling Huge Back-
log, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 13, 1990, at 1 (same author). State-federal cooperation in case manage-
ment generally is promoted through the State-Federal Councils, which assist in resolving
scheduling conflicts and other tensions inherent in the dual court system. See Pratt, The
State of New York's State-Federal Judicial Council, 3 TouRo L. REV. 1 (1986); Wallace,
Before State and Federal Courts Clash, THE JUDGE'S JOURNAL 37 (A.B.A. Fall 1985).
222 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1988).
222 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 44.
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management of asbestos cases nationwide.224 As more and more
appeals come to the circuit courts in asbestos and other cases, at-
tention is drawn to the decisional process in the courts of appeals.
D. Decisional Process
In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the decisional process
begins long before oral argument, when each judge reviews each
case assigned to the panel of which he or she is to be a member for
the forthcoming sitting. Even before oral argument, therefore, each
judge has a tentative impression of the way most of the cases
should be decided. These views are subject to change by oral argu-
ment, by the views of colleagues expressed after oral argument, or
by the unique "voting memoranda" that have been the custom in
the Second Circuit for many years.2 Voting memoranda, although
not employed as frequently now as in earlier times, provide the
means for each judge on the panel to circulate his or her views to
the other members of the panel.22 6 They are particularly useful to
the judge assigned as author of an opinion and serve an important
function in crystallizing the issues in the more complicated cases.
The decisional process continues as each opinion is written
and circulated. From time to time, an author will be far along in
drafting an opinion before coming to the realization that his or her
position should be changed. "It won't write" is the phrase com-
monly used in this situation. The author then may persuade the
other members of the panel of the rightness of the change of view,
or the opinion must be reassigned. The senior active judge serving
on the panel presides (unless the chief judge sits)22 7 and, if in the
majority, assigns opinion-writing chores for each case. It is the cus-
tom to allow senior judges in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
to express their preference as to opinion-writing assignments. It
has become the practice for the judge presiding to draft summary
orders for the signature of the other members of the panel when a
case is disposed of by that device. When a draft of a full opinion is
completed, it is circulated among the judges of the panel for sug-
gestions, objections, and responsive concurrences or dissents.
224 See Blum, Untangling Asbestos Litigation, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 18, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
2126 Medina, Foreword: The "Old" Second Circuit in 1951, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 199,
200-01 (1979).
"2 Feinberg, supra note 193, at 298.
227 28 U.S.C. § 45(b); COMM. ON FEDERAL COURTS, ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
N.Y., APPEALS TO THE SECOND CiRcurr 1 (6th ed. 1988).
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A unique practice in the Second Circuit is the use of "tabs."
No opinion is accepted for filing by the clerk in the Second Circuit
without the signed tab of each judge on the panel (other than the
author) attached to it.2 28 The tab indicates that the signer of the
tab concurs in the opinion or concurs with a separate opinion or
dissents with a separate opinion. Sometimes a tab is withheld until
the author makes certain suggested changes that the judge with-
holding the tab deems necessary before he br she can concur. More
often, the tab is forwarded with a memorandum of suggested
changes deemed appropriate but not essential. A dissenter merely
enters the fact of dissent on the tab and sends along the dissenting
opinion to the author of the majority opinion for filing. The same
practice prevails as to concurring opinions. The decisional process
does not end after an opinion is filed, for the losing party is enti-
tled to, and frequently does, request a rehearing by the panel.2 29
Upon receipt of the petition for rehearing, the panel once again is
constrained to give attention to the case and to consider the
grounds urged for rehearing. From time to time, the petition re-
suits in technical changes or even in substantive changes in the
opinion. Rarely, however, is there an actual rehearing of oral argu-
ment before the original panel.
Decisionmaking continues when the entire court considers a
suggestion for rehearing in banc23 The suggestion most often is
included in the petition for rehearing before the panel, and the pe-
tition is circulated along with the results of the vote taken by the
panel for rehearing. Any member of the court in active service, and
any senior judge who sat on the panel may respond to the "sugges-
tion" or call for an in banc vote without a suggestion.23 ' A vote
then is taken, and the determination of whether there will be an in
banc rehearing is made by a majority of the active judges.3 2 In the
Second Circuit, neither vacancies nor disqualifications are counted
in determining the base on which a majority is calculated. 233 It is
customary for each judge eligible to vote to do so by a written
memorandum giving reasons for the vote. In this way, the deci-
sional process continues right up through the in banc rehearing, if
228 Feinberg, supra note 193, at 314.
29 See FED. R. APP. P. 40.
230 Id. rule 35(b).
231 Id. rule 35(a).
232 Id.
233 2D CIR. R. 35.
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granted, and the circulation of opinions for the in banc opinion.
The in banc process of decisionmaking is not highly favored in
the Second Circuit. Two in banc decisions, in cases pertaining to
the same issue and heard at the same time, were filed in 1989,234
and only one in 1990.235 As of this writing, one petition for rehear-
ing in banc was granted in 1991 and one in banc decision is pend-
ing in a case argued in 1990.236 The general view of the judges of
the court is that the in banc procedure is inefficient, that it de-
tracts from collegiality, and that it is particularly unnecessary in a
court that strictly adheres to precedent.3 7 In banc decisionmaking
has not occurred as frequently in the Second Circuit as it has in
the other circuits, but panel opinions sometimes are circulated to
the full court before filing.238 Several in banc polls have been taken
in the Second Circuit in recent months, and the rejection of in
banc consideration by a majority of the court clearly indicates that
the Second Circuit's distaste for this process continues.
The Study Committee recommends that
Congress should allow each court of appeals to perform its in
banc functions by such number of the members of its in banc
court as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals, except
that the number should not be less than nine unless the court has
fewer than nine authorized judgeships. 239
As has been noted, the present rule is that circuits with more than
fifteen members may perform their in banc functions by whatever
number may be prescribed by the court.2 40 The Study Committee
gives no real reason to allow smaller courts to perform their in
bane function by fewer than all of the circuit judges. Those who
23 See Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386 (2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
539 (1989); United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 56 (1989).
23I See United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1990) (in banc), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1071 (1991).
2" See Asherman v. Meachum, 932 F.2d 137 (2d Cir.); United States v. Chestman, 903
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990).
' See Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, 55 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 355, 369 (1989); In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50
BRoo I.YN L. REv. 365, 383 (1984) (same author).
I' Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1984-1988, supra note 237, at
367; see also Kramer v. Time Warner, Inc., (No. 90-9014, slip op. (2d Cir. June 27, 1991);
Germain v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 926 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1991) (opinion circulated to all
active judges before filing); United States v. Castiglia, 894 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1990) (same).
39 STurv CommrrrE REPORT, supra note 70, at 114-15.
240 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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dissent from this recommendation observe that the views of the
majority of circuit judges may not be reflected in an in banc deci-
sion in which fewer than all participate and that "failure to include
some judges in the decision-making process risks a diminution in
the quality of the decisions made. '241 It is interesting to note that
64% of those circuit judges responding to the Study Committee's
question: "How do you react to the concept of a small en banc
panel (i.e., less than a whole court)?" answered: "I would oppose
such a panel. '242 Based on past reaction to in banc panels in gen-
eral, it would seem safe to say that the percentage of judges op-
posed to smaller in bancs in the Second Circuit would be much
higher.
The Study Committee devotes a considerable part of its ef-
forts in dealing with the appellate caseload crisis to the issue of
intercircuit conflicts. Recommended is a study by the Federal Ju-
dicial Center of the number and frequency of such conflicts, and
an analysis of those that "are, by some objective criterion, truly
'intolerable' yet, for whatever reason, unlikely to be resolved by the
Supreme Court. ' 243 It is questionable just what purpose would be
served by such a study. In any event, the Committee does propose
a five-year experimental project to resolve intercircuit conflicts by
having the Supreme Court refer selected cases to an in banc court
of appeals to resolve the issue and thereby create a national prece-
dent.244 Of course, the referral must be to a court of appeals not
involved in the conflict issue, and rehearing or reconsideration
could be sought in the Supreme Court.245 It is estimated that there
were more than sixty intercircuit conflicts in 1988, but it is ex-
pected that the Supreme Court would refer a much smaller num-
ber each year.246 One Committee member dissents from so much of
the proposal as would allow the Supreme Court a second crack at
the case: "Once the Supreme Court refers a case to an in banc
court of appeals for final disposition of the conflict issue, the Su-
preme Court should be prohibited from reviewing the decision of
the in banc tribunal. ' 247
241 STUDY CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 115.
242 Galard & Wood, supra note 83, at 9.
241 STUDY COMMrrrF REPORT, supra note 70, at 125.
24 Id. at 126.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 127.
247 Id. at 128.
[Vol. 65:673
PLANNING FOR THE SECOND CENTURY
Apart from the pilot project recommended by the Study Com-
mittee, there is a recommendation that "considerable respect"
should be afforded to an earlier decision of another circuit; the rec-
ommendation includes the suggestion that, where disagreement
with another circuit is contemplated, the "disagreeable" panel
should circulate its opinion to the remaining judges of the court for
comment.248 There is much to be said for this procedure, despite
the dissenters' concern that it would lead to an "informal invisible
in banc procedure," stifle the "percolation" in the decisionmaking
process, and create extra work.249 The question, of course, is
whether intercircuit conflicts really are as severe a problem as the
Study Committee makes them out to be. The Committee may have
been putting the cart before the horse when it recommended the
pilot project and made the deference proposal before getting the
results of the suggested study. In some matters, intercircuit con-
flict is not such a bad thing, especially when it may draw the atten-
tion of Congress to a situation best remedied by the legislative
branch.
A rule of the Second Circuit provides for dispositions in open
court or by summary order in cases of unanimous decision where
"each judge of the panel believes that no jurisprudential purpose
would be served by a written opinion"; a brief written statement
may be made part of the order, but the rule provides that the
statements are not formal opinions of the court and, since they
"are unreported and not uniformly available to all parties, they
shall not be cited or otherwise used in unrelated cases before this
or any other court. ' 250 Oral decisions are almost totally out of
vogue in the Second Circuit, but the summary disposition proce-
dure has accounted for between forty-five percent and sixty-five
percent of the decisions of the Second Circuit in the last ten
years.251 In 1990, fifty-six percent, or 666 of the 1,190 cases dis-
posed of by decision in the Second Circuit, were concluded by
summary order.252 Generally, cases not deemed to have "jurispru-
dential purpose" are those that have no "precedential purpose."
The cases disposed of by summary order are decided on the basis
of well-settled law, and no advantage would be gained by a full,
"04 Id. at 129.
249 Id. at 129-30.
25 2D CMR. R. 0.23.
251 1990 SECOND Ciacurr REPORT, supra note 36, at 8.
252 Id.
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published opinion in the case. Much time and effort is saved by
this decisional process, although the bar long has opposed the lack
of general access to unpublished opinions.253 There is some unfair-
ness in the nonpublication system, and the Study Committee has
put forward a worthwhile suggestion to remedy the matter.
"A representative ad hoc committee under the auspices of the
Judicial Conference should review policy on unpublished court
opinions in light of increasing ease and decreasing cost of database
access." 254 The Committee recognizes that there is an important
need to avoid loading books with opinions involving "easy applica-
tions of established law to fact. ' 255 The Committee also acknowl-
edges the argument "that non-publication policies are inconsis-
tently administered and partially circumvented when regular
litigants often circulate such opinions internally and make use of
them in other cases. '256 Even a decision not deemed significant
enough for publication should be available to support the argu-
ment of a litigant to whom it applies. The use of computer
databases for the compilation of these opinions seems to be "just
the ticket" for the long-standing problems generated by nonpubli-
cation. These databases could be entered easily by all who wish to
do so, and this process of open access to opinions, even those with-
out precedential value, would be most reassuring to those who per-
ceive unfairness in the present system. While the problem of unac-
knowledged use is said to arise if distribution is freely made while
citation is restricted,257 it seems to this author that the problem is
vastly overstated. One thing is certain-the published opinions are
just too many and too lengthy, and part of the reason for that may
lie in the role of law clerks in the decisional process.
It is generally accepted that law clerks have come to play an
increasing role in the drafting of opinions. 58 Indeed, the volume of
opinions undertaken by each court of appeals judge leaves no alter-
See Pratt, Summary Orders in the Second Circuit Under Rule 0.23, 51 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 479, 490-93 (1985) (summarizing six categories of "complaints"); see also Marke,
Unpublished and Uncitable Court Decisions, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1991, at 4, col. 4 (noting
bar's opposition to Second Circuit rule prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions).
25 STUDY COMMITTE REPORT, supra note 70, at 130.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 See D. STIENSTRA, UNPUBLISHED DISPOSITIONS: PROBLEMS OF ACCESS AND USE IN THE
COURTS OF APPEALS 47 (Federal Judicial Center 1985).
"I A. DILEo & A. RUBIN, LAW CLERK HANDBOOK: A HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT
AND APPELLATE COURT LAW CLERKS § 1.200 (Federal Judicial Center 1977).
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native. In the Study Committee survey, nine percent of the circuit
judges responding prepared the first draft in all cases, fifteen per-
cent never prepared the first draft and seventy-six percent pre-
pared the first draft in some cases.2 59 Opinions drafted in the first
instance by law clerks tend to be longer than those drafted by
judges, a function of inexperience.26 ° What is not necessary at this
juncture of increasing caseloads and excessive legal literature is
any increase in the number or length of opinions published in
hard-bound volumes.261 No one can contend that all the opinions
now published have "jurisprudential purpose" or that such a pur-
pose is advanced by such exegeses as now are published. The goal
should be to cut down the number and length of published opin-
ions. The Study Committee recommendation for the increased use
by district judges of their authority to make oral findings of fact
and conclusions of law26 2 would help to achieve this goal, at least
as far as district court opinions are concerned.
The decisional process as it relates to the processing of pro se
cases in the appellate context also came to the Study Committee's
attention. The Committee noted that, in the First Circiit, pro se
litigants were involved in about fifteen percent of the district court
cases and thirty percent of the cases in the court of appeals.2 3 The
Committee recommended (1) that data pertaining to pro se litiga-
tion be compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts; (2) that a Judicial Conference Committee be designated to
evaluate the costs of pro se litigation to the litigants and to the
courts; and (3) that the committee so designated "recommend to
the Conference methods to reduce those costs and to improve the
efficiencies of dispensing justice in those cases. 2 64 A large volume
of pro se cases is processed in the district courts as well as in the
Court of Appeals in the Second Circuit. The system used for
processing pro se cases in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
might be of interest as a model for other circuits,265 but is open for
any improvement that might come about as a result of the Study
2"9 Gaflard & Wood, supra note 83, at 12.
280 Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or For Worse?, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 321, 339-40
(1988).
2'1 See R. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 1-3 (1990).
282 See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (granting authority); see also STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 70, at 102 (recommending increased use of authority).
283 STUDY CoMMIrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 112.
264 Id.
21' See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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Committee's recommendation.
The decisional process in the Second Circuit has been much
aided by the installation of facsimile machines in the chambers of
each circuit judge. The exchange of memoranda, proposed opin-
ions, and "tabs" has been expedited by this technological innova-
tion, which finds much use in a court whose judges are spread over
three states. Past studies have dealt with such innovations as word
processing and electronic mail.2"' In this age of computers, long-
range technology planning is required.26 7 The Study Committee
recommends that the Judicial Conference enhance its long-range
planning capability, with the support of the Federal Judicial
Center, and determine, among other things, how "the judiciary
[should] adapt-in its administration and its decisional proce-
dures-to major scientific and technological changes. ' 268 The Com-
mittee recommends specifically that Congress increase Federal Ju-
dicial Center funding for training in automation and computers.2 9
No discussion of the decisionmaking process would be com-
plete without a mention of the work of senior judges. Not only do
senior judges bring great wisdom to the enterprise by reason of
long experience and great knowledge, but they also carry an impor-
tant share of the workload burden. In the Second Circuit, the abil-
ity of the court of appeals to maintain a current status has been
due in large part to the work of senior judges.21 0 They are indeed a
161 See Greenwood, Follow-Up Study of Word Processing and Electronic Mail in the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1980), in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING APPEALS IN
FEDERAL COURTS 801 (M. Tonry & R.A. Katzmann ed. 1988); Greenwood & Farmer, The
Impact of Word Processing and Electronic Mail on United States Courts of Appeals
(1979), in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS, supra, at 749.
Another indirect, yet important, way to advance the use of technology is through the
decentralization of the budget process. While the Study Committee directs the Judicial
Conference to consider how the judiciary should adapt to major scientific and technological
changes, see STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 147, presently the acquisition of
new equipment or updated computer systems often involves a time-consuming process of
waiting for authorization and disbursement of funds from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. Decentralization allows each circuit to reallocate and disburse funds
when needed. The Second Circuit was one of the first courts of appeals to participate in a
pilot decentralization program. See id. at 161. Beginning on October 1, 1991, all courts of
appeals on a voluntary basis may participate in the program over a three-year period. JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE AcTIONs TAKEN BY
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 2 (Mar. 12, 1991).
267 U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 1990 UPDATE: LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
AUTOMATION IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1990).
268 STUDY COMMIrrrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 147.
260 Id. at 155.
270 Feinberg, Senior Judges: A National Resource, 56 BROOKLYN L. REv. 409, 413
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"national resource. ' ' 27 1 The Study Committee recognizes the im-
portance of using these semiretired judges, noting that their ab-
sence from the scene would require eighty additional judgeships in
the nation at a cost of $45 million.7 2 It is not surprising that the
Committee recommends that "Congress should not enact disincen-
tives to senior judge service. 2 7 3 The Study Committee makes two
other important recommendations bearing on the decisional pro-
cess. It recommends that court of appeals judges sit in other courts
of appeals from time to time on an exchange basis for educational
purposes 274 and that the role of circuit chief judges be studied.27 5
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has been fortunate in having
been led by chief judges who have been excellent administrators as
well as distinguished scholars, and who have assumed nearly full
caseloads despite the time-consuming internal, external, and sys-
temic nondecisional duties they have been constrained to per-
form. 6 While adjustments in the decisional process may be help-
ful, it seems to this author that adjustments in jurisdiction offer
the best, although probably the least possible, chance for success in
dealing with the federal caseload crisis in the courts of appeals in
general and in the Second Circuit in particular.
E. Jurisdiction
Adjustments in federal court jurisdiction can play a significant
part in containing the flow of cases to the courts of appeals. The
expansion of government and the creation of new federal rights
through congressional legislation have accounted for a great deal of
the present caseload burden. Congress has so extensively exercised
its article III powers to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts
that it now seems that there is virtually no area of human activity
with which the modern federal court system is unconcerned. Al-
most no session of Congress passes without some new area being
opened up for federal court attention, either intentionally or by
mistake. The need to cut back seems apparent as does the need for
(1990).
271 Id.
272 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 154.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 155.
278 Id. at 153.
278 See Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge of a Federal Court of Appeals, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 369, 389 (1984).
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restraint in the future. The Study Committee has confronted the
situation by recommending some divestiture of present jurisdiction
and a process by which Congress can monitor the judicial impact
of new legislation.
A substantial majority of the Study Committee recommends
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction with certain narrow excep-
tions .2 78 The Committee notes that diversity cases account for a
substantial portion of the federal court caseload and a not inconse-
quential portion of the federal judicial budget: almost one out of
four district court cases; about one of two civil trials; about one in
ten appeals; and more than one dollar in every ten in the federal
judicial budget.279 Diversity jurisdiction enables litigants to have
cases governed by state law resolved in federal court simply be-
cause they are citizens of different states, where the amount in
controversy exceeds $50,000.280 The federal courts have had diver-
sity jurisdiction since the original Judiciary Act,21 and the Fram-
ers of the Constitution obviously contemplated that Congress
might want to confer this jurisdiction upon the federal courts.8 2
The fear of prejudice to out-of-state residents commonly has been
thought to form the original basis for this provision.2 3 The Study
Committee gives two reasons in support of its recommendation:
"no other class of cases has a weaker claim on federal resources,"
and "no other step will do anywhere nearly as much to reduce fed-
eral caseload pressures and contain the growth of the federal
judiciary. '2 8' 4
The channeling of diversity cases to state courts would gener-
ate an average of eleven more cases for each general jurisdiction
277 For a contrary viewpoint, see Brown, Nonideological Judicial Reform and Its Lim-
its-The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973
(1990).
278 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 38.
279 Id. at 38-39; see also A. PARTRIDGE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION (Federal Judicial Center 1988).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988). Since the amount in controversy was increased from
$10,000 to $50,000 in May of 1989, there was a decrease of 15% in diversity filings in 1990.
See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TE U. S. COURTS, THE JUDICIARY BUDGET IN BRIEF FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 1992, at 7 (Jan. 1991).
281 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79.
282 U.S. CONST. art. III provides that the judicial power shall extend to controversies
"between Citizens of different States." See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 7-8 (2d ed. 1990).
' See C. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 23, at 133.
284 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 39.
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state court judge, an insignificant burden in view of the larger ag-
gregate volume of cases in the state courts." 5 The proposal for a
total abolition of diversity jurisdiction still calls forth strong reac-
tion, both pro and con.2 88 Accordingly, the Study Committee has
put forward a "back-up proposal" consisting of four items designed
"to remove the more extreme dysfunctions of the current jurisdic-
tion": Plaintiffs should be prohibited from invoking diversity juris-
diction in their home states, since they need no protection against
the bias feared by out-of-state litigants; corporations should be
considered citizens of every state in which they do business for the
reason that they need no protection against bias in states where
they are licensed to conduct their affairs; noneconomic damages
such as pain and suffering should be excluded when calculating the
amount in controversy in order to prevent the puffing up of the
jurisdictional minimum; and the amount in controversy should be
raised to $75,000. 1 7 Some of the judges of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals have argued quite forcefully for the abolition of
diversity jurisdiction.28
The need to deal with the tremendous increase in caseloads
generated by the ever-expanding criminal jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, particularly in the area of narcotics prosecution, did
not escape the notice of the Study Committee. The Committee rec-
ommended that "[flederal prosecuting authorities should limit fed-
eral prosecutions to charges that cannot or should not be prose-
cuted in the state courts and should forge federal-state
partnerships to coordinate prosecution efforts."28 9 It also recom-
mended that Congress provide additional funds to assist the states
in the war on drugs, based on the finding that "[t]he federal
courts' most pressing problems-today and for the immediate fu-
ture-stem from unprecedented numbers of federal narcotics pros-
15 Id. at 41. For a detailed study of the effect on state courts of eliminating or restrict-
ing diversity jurisdiction, see Flango & Boersema, Changes in Federal Diversity Jurisdic-
tion: Effects on State Court Caseloads, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 405 (1990).
288 See M.C. BUTLER & J. FRANK, ABOLITION OF DivnERsiTY JURISDICTION: AN IDEA WHOSE
Tzi HAS Cotm? (National Legal Center for Public Interest 1983); see also M. REDISH,
FEDERAL COURTS 566-69 (2d ed. 1989).
287 STUDY CoimsrrE REPORT, supra note 70, at 42.
28 See Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose Time has Passed?, 61 N.Y.
ST. B.J. 14 (July 1989); Kaufman, supra note 148, at 8-9; Miner, Tensions of a Dual Court
System, 51 ALB. L. REv. 151, 158 (1987).
289 STUDY COMI JIrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 35.
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ecutions. '2 9 0 Between 1980 and 1990, criminal drug filings in the
district courts rose from 3,127 to 12,221, an increase of 256%, and
the impact is felt in the courts of appeals.291 In many district
courts, the need to attend to narcotics and drug cases makes it
impossible for judges to keep current with their civil calendars.292
There seems to be no need to pursue some of the less serious drug
cases in the federal courts, and the untempered zeal of federal
prosecutors in doing so must be curbed if there is to be a cutback
in this jurisdiction.293 Unfortunately, Congress is just as zealous as
federal prosecutors and is loath to permit any session to pass with-
out providing some "ammunition" for the "drug wars. ''2"1 The in-
stitution of "Federal Day," a day set aside in some jurisdictions for
the federal prosecution of drug offenders arrested by state of-
ficers,29 narrowly escaped institutionalization in the federal law.
The proposal by Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, that all arrests for narcotics offenses on one
day of each month in every federal district be prosecuted under
federal law would have doubled the already staggering caseload of
the federal system.296
The Study Committee found as a general matter that "[t]he
current federal criminal law is hard to find, hard to understand,
redundant, and conflicting. 29 7 More than 3,000 separate federal
statutory offenses are scattered throughout the -United States
Code, including offenses such as interstate transportation of water
hyacinths, 2 8 false crop reports, 29 and false weather reports.300
290 Id.
291 WORKLOAD STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 47.
292 Sturgess, Federal Court Watch: Judges Rap Stephens on Drug Cases, Legal Times,
Feb. 11, 1991, at 7; see also Civil Justice Reform Act Implementation Moves Ahead, 23 Tim
THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1991, at 8.
293 See Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law, 4 CRIM. J. 16 (1989).
29 See, e.g., Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789; Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-231, 103 Stat. 1954.
291 See, e.g., United States v. Agilar, 779 F.2d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1985) (sale of narcotics
arrest by New York City police officers became subject of federal prosecution because it
occurred on Federal Day), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).
29. Biden vs. Federal Judges, Again; Plan Would Shift Many Drug Cases From States,
Legal Times, May 21, 1990, at 6.
297 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 106.
299 18 U.S.C. § 46 (1988).
299 Id. § 2072.
"'* Id. § 2074. The Study Committee also took note of reproducing the image of
"Smokey the Bear" without permission, id. § 711, and taking false teeth into a state without
the approval of a local dentist. Id. § 1821. See STUDY COMmTTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at
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Considering it a "pressing matter for Congress's attention," the
Committee recommends the establishment of a Code Revision
Commission, noting that a similar Commission was authorized in
1966, presented a report in 1971 and never saw any results of its
labors despite congressional consideration of the report between
1971 and 1982.301 This author long has argued for a cutback in fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction and has urged that Congress discard all
federal crimes except those clearly identified as pertaining to mat-
ters of national interest.302 There seems to be no reason why crimes
that effectively can be prosecuted under state law should be prose-
cuted in federal courts. Indeed, an argument can be made for con-
ferring upon state courts jurisdiction over certain federal crimes. 303
According to the Study Committee, petitions from state pris-
oners complaining of the conditions of their confinement consti-
tuted one percent of all federal civil filings in 1958 and 12.3% (ap-
proximately 26,155 in number) in 1990. o4 In 1980 Congress
authorized district courts faced with these cases, fied under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, to require the prisoners to exhaust state administra-
tive procedures.305 The exhaustion requirement cannot be imposed,
however, unless the United States Attorney General has certified,
or a district court has determined, that the administrative proce-
dures are in substantial compliance with certain minimum stan-
dards provided in the authorizing statute.30 Few states have pur-
sued certification, one objection being the necessary involvement of
prisoners themselves in the process of developing an appropriate
administrative procedure.3 0 7 The Study Committee recommends
that state administrative resolution of section 1983 claims brought
by prisoners be encouraged by simply allowing a state to persuade
106.
... STUDY CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 106.
302 See Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 117, 127 (1987); see also Weinstein, RICO and Federalism, in ,NAT'L LEGAL CENTER
FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, THE RICO RACKET 69 (1989).
801 See Miner, supra note 302, at 127-28.
304 WoRvLoAD STATISTICS, supra note 29, at 31; STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note
70, at 49.
305 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1988).
306 Id. § 1997e(a)(2).
307 See Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures for State Prisoners Under Section
1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IowA L. REV. 935, 947 (1986) ("requirement of inmate and
employee advisory input ... derived directly from Congress' provision for the Attorney
General's consultation with outside groups having expertise in the corrections field to assure
effective and procedurally fair certified grievance procedures").
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either a federal court or the Attorney General that its administra-
tive remedy simply is "fair and effective."30 8 The federal lawsuit
then could be put on "hold" for a period of 120 days while the
administrative process took its course. The court would have the
power to waive the exhaustion requirement in cases of hardship.
The resolution of prisoner complaints in this way would provide
some relief for the courts of the Second Circuit, and the small ju-
risdictional adjustment recommended also would afford prisoners
an early resolution of grievances that otherwise might be subject to
lengthy delays.309 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is re-
quired in the case of challenges to conditions of confinement by
federal prisoners, 1°0 and the rule seems to be of benefit both to
prisoners and courts in the federal system.
Some jurisdictional adjustments suggested by the Study Com-
mittee under the heading, "Creating Non-Judicial Branch Forums
for Business Currently in the Federal Courts, 31' would be of mar-
ginal benefit in lessening the flow to the courts of appeals but are
worthy of consideration. They include the creation of a new system
for adjudicating disability claims under the Social Security Act, in-
cluding a new article I Court of Disability Claims from which ap-
peals would be taken to the courts of appeals on questions of law
only;312 a prohibition on the policy of non-acquiescence by an
amendment to the Social Security Act requiring the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to abide by holdings of the circuit
where the benefits claim is filed, except in test cases designated by
the Solicitor General;3 13 a five-year test program to allow the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to arbitrate employment
cases by consent;3 14 and the repeal of the Federal Employer's Lia-
bility Act to allow injured railroad employees to recover damages
under state or federal workers' compensation systems, and the re-
s1 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 48-49. But see Note, Resolving Prison-
ers' Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1309 (1991) (cautioning
against alteration of statute without further information or study).
309 See Limit Inmates' Suits, New York State Asks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1991, at A33,
col. 1.; see also Stashenko, NY courts clogged by inmate suits, Associated Press Release,
Feb. 28, 1991.
310 E.g., Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849, 850 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 63
(1990).
311 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 55.
312 Id. at 55-59.
313 Id. at 59-60.
314 Id. at 60-61.
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peal of the Jones Act to allow recovery of damages by injured
seamen under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act. 15 Another marginally beneficial jurisdictional adjustment,
listed by the. Study Committee under the heading "Reallocating
Business Between the State and Federal Systems, ' 316 would
"amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act to forbid
removal from state to federal court of cases in which the amount in
controversy is less than $10,000. '1317
Certain adjustments are proposed by the Study Committee in
the interests of jurisdictional efficiency. These proposals are made
in the spirit of the Committee's desire to have a "better" rather
than a "smaller" federal court system.3 18 The Committee recom-
mended that Congress authorize pendent jurisdiction over parties
when there is no independent federal basis for the exercise of such
jurisdiction.31 9 Recognizing that the abolition or curtailment of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction would eliminate some claims
from the federal courts, the Committee deems it "unwise" to do
S0.320 The Committee's proposal would overcome the holding of
Finley v. United States,321 that "a grant of jurisdiction over claims
involving particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over
additional claims by or against different parties. ' 3 22 The Study
Committee would allow the federal courts to hear any claim "aris-
ing out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' as a claim within
federal jurisdiction, including claims, within federal question juris-
diction, that require the joinder of additional parties, namely, de-
fendants against whom that plaintiff has a closely related state
claim. '32 3 The Study Committee would allow federal courts to dis-
miss state claims if such claims predominate or for other rea-
sons.3 24 Another jurisdictional adjustment recommended in the in-
terests of efficiency is the repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), which
, Id. at 62-63. "Eliminating FELA and Jones Act cases would reduce the district
courts' civil docket by 2 percent and the court of appeals docket by 1 percent." Id. at 62.
:" Id. at 35.
317 Id. at 43.
318 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
" STUDY CommrrrE REPORT, supra note 70, at 47.
20O Id.
321 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
322 Id. at 556.
323 STUDY CoMMrrrE REPORT, supra note 70, at 47.
12, Id. at 48. The Study Committee reasons that federal court dismissal of predomi-
nantly state claims, or state claims presenting novel or complex questions of state law,
would minimize friction between state and federal courts. Id. at 47-48.
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
allows the removal of separate and independent claims that would
have been removable if sued upon alone when joined with one or
more otherwise nonremovable claims.2 5 Section 1441(c) allows re-
moval of the entire case where there is diversity jurisdiction be-
tween a plaintiff and one defendant but not between plaintiff and
another defendant.
In exercising its authority to confer jurisdiction upon the fed-
eral courts, it is incumbent upon Congress to consider the impact
of any legislation upon the judicial branch. Accordingly, the Study
Committee has recommended that an Office of Judicial Impact As-
sessment be created to advise Congress on the effect of proposed
legislation and the potential for litigation attendant thereto.32 6
Also proposed is a checklist for Congress to consider in reviewing
proposed legislation.2 7 Obviously, a checklist has great potential
for identifying technical problems in proposed legislation. A check-
list review also can serve to identify duplicative and unnecessary
legislation. The most comprehensive legislative drafting checklist
yet developed seems to have been overlooked by the Study Com-
mittee. It was developed by the Office of Legislation and Public
Affairs of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
and forwarded to all United States Senators by the Legislative and
Public Affairs Officer of the Administrative Office.3 28 This author
contributed to the drafting of that checklist, and it is set out here
in full:
1. Does an existing statute of limitations apply to a civil en-
forcement action provided for in proposed legislation? If not,
what if any statute of limitations should be specified in the pro-
posed legislation?
2. Does proposed legislation include an effective date or ap-
plicability provision that states the intent of Congress on whether
or not the legislation is to apply retroactively?
325 Id. at 94-95.
528 Id. at 89-92; see also FED. BAR COUNCIL COMM. ON SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS, A RE-
PORT ON JUDICIAL IMPACT LEGISLATION (Dec. 15, 1989); Miner, Preemptive Strikes on State
Autonomy: The Role of Congress, in THE HERITAGE LECTURES (The Heritage Foundation
1987). The Administrative Office of the United States Courts already has established a Judi-
cial Impact Office to provide information to members of Congress, Judicial Conference com-
mittees, and others in connection with legislative proposals. See Judicial Impact Office
Takes Message to Congress, 23 THE THIRD BRANCH, May 1991, at 1.
"" STUDY COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 91-92.
32' See Letter from Robert E. Feidler to all United States Senators (June 12, 1990)
(discussing checklist appended to letter).
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3. If proposed legislation provides for an award of attorneys'
fees, does it clearly specify the terms under which an attorney's
fee can be awarded?
4. In the case of proposed legislation that covers a subject
matter covered by existing or anticipated legislation of any State,
does the proposed Federal legislation contain a clear statement on
whether the proposed Federal legislation is to preempt the ex-
isting or anticipated State legislation?
5. In the case of proposed legislation that creates or modifies
a criminal offense, does the proposed legislation clearly specify
the state of mind element, if any? Is any inconsistency between
the specified state of mind element and the state of mind element
of analogous criminal offenses intended?
6. Is it intended that proposed legislation grant private par-
ties a right to sue to vindicate a Federal interest? If so, is the
nature and extent of that right specified in the proposed
legislation?
7. Should proposed legislation contain a severability provi-
sion to cover the eventuality of a provision of the legislation being
held unconstitutional?
8. Is it desirable that a claimant or grievant exhaust adminis-
trative remedies before the claimant or grievant is permitted to
commence a civil action under proposed legislation? If so, does
the proposed legislation contain such a requirement?
9. In the case of proposed legislation that creates obligations
enforceable in Federal courts, does the proposed legislation spe-
cifically provide for personal jurisdiction of the obligated parties?
10. Does proposed legislation that regulates business transac-
tions state whether or not any of the statutory provisions may be
superseded by an arbitration or other dispute resolution agree-
ment between parties to such transactions?
11. Does proposed legislation specifically define key terms?
12. Does proposed legislation that provides for administrative
rulemaking, administrative hearings, or other administrative pro-
ceedings specify whether the proceedings are to be formal or
informal?
13. In the case of proposed legislation intended to supersede
other Federal law, does the proposed legislation specifically repeal
or amend the other Federal law?
14. Does proposed legislation displace or accommodate judi-
cial interpretations of existing law? If so, is that result intended?
15. Are State courts to have jurisdiction over civil actions re-
sulting from proposed legislation? If so, does the proposed legisla-
tion so state, and does it further state whether such an action is
removable to a Federal Court?
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16. Does proposed legislation specify the forms of relief avail-
able in litigation under the legislation?
17. If proposed legislation specifies deadlines for judicial ac-
tion, is the deadline necessary? If so, is the deadline reasonable
with respect to judicial resources and existing caseload?
18. If proposed legislation provides for judicial review by a
multi-judge panel, is the requirement for more than one judge
necessary?
19. What, if any, effect will proposed legislation have on the
caseload burden of the Federal and State courts? Do the benefits
of the proposed legislation justify any increased caseload burden?
If so, can the proposed legislation be drafted to minimize the in-
crease in burden consistent with the policy objectives of the pro-
posed legislation?
20. Will additional court resources be required in order for
courts to handle litigation resulting from proposed legislation? Do
the benefits of the proposed legislation justify the resulting in-
creased requirements? If so, does the proposed legislation provide
the required additional resources?
VI. ADJUSTMENTS ADOPTED AND FURTHER STUDIES INITIATED
The report of the Federal Courts Study Committee already
has produced results. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
signed into law on December 1, 1990,329 implements several of the
Committee's recommendations. Indeed, title III of the Act is enti-
tled "Implementation of Federal Courts Study Committee Recom-
mendations." In the area of court structure, the Act provides for a
Federal Judicial Center study of "the full range of structural alter-
natives for the Federal Courts of Appeals," with a report on the
study to be submitted to Congress and the Judicial Conference in
two years.38 0 In the area of decisional process, the Act calls for a
Judicial Center study of intercircuit conflicts, with a report to be
completed by January 1, 1992 "on the number and frequency of
conflicts among the judicial circuits in interpreting the law that re-
main unresolved because they are not heard by the Supreme
Court. '3 31 The Center is directed specifically to consider whether
intercircuit conflicts: impose economic burdens on those engaged
I' Supra note 20. The Act is summarized in Guiffra, The Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 26, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
33 Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, § 302(c).
11 Id. § 302(a).
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in interstate commerce; encourage forum shopping; create unfair-
ness to litigants; and encourage federal agency nonacquiescence
policies.3 32
The Study Committee's recommendation regarding pendent
party jurisdiction was adopted in the 1990 Act, which provides, in
a section entitled "Supplemental Jurisdiction," that district courts
having original jurisdiction of a claim, except in diversity cases and
as expressly provided by federal statute, "shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution." 33 Supplemental jurisdiction may be declined as to
claims: raising state law issues of a novel or complex nature; sub-
stantially predominating over the claims subject of original juris-
diction; remaining after the dismissal of all claims subject of origi-
nal jurisdiction; and involving exceptional circumstances and
compelling reasons to decline. 4
Congress partially accepted the Study Committee's recom-
mendation to repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), which permitted the re-
moval of an entire case from state to federal court where a sepa-
rate and independent claim that would have been removable if
sued upon alone were joined with one or more claims that were
transactionally unrelated and otherwise not removable. 335 Rather
than repealing the entire provision as recommended, Congress
opted for limiting removal to cases in which the separate and inde-
pendent claims fall within federal question jurisdiction. 36 After re-
moval, the district court "may remand all matters in which State
Law predominates. '337 Three commentators already have identi-
fied a problem with the removal provision because the provision
may be construed as authorizing remand of the federal question
claim, a result clearly not intended.33 The same commentators
also see a constitutional problem unless the new statute is inter-
preted to mean that the district court must remand all claims that
would not have been within the federal court's original or supple-
Id. § 302(b).
Id. § 310(a) (adding § 1367(a) to title 28).
Id. § 310(a) (adding § 1367(c) to title 28).
35 See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
-3 Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, § 312(1).
-7 Id. § 312(2).
38 See Mengler, Burbank & Rowe, Recent Federal Court Legislation Made Some
Noteworthy Changes, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 31, 1990, at 20, col. 1.
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mental jurisdiction if filed in the federal court in the first place.33 9
The provision in the original statute, affording discretion to re-
mand "all matters not otherwise within [the] original jurisdiction,"
has been repealed.3 40 However, the amended statute may well serve
its purpose of limiting the amount of litigation over separate claim
removal, the Study Committee having noted that the old statute
"cause[d] much litigation apart from the merits as defendants
tr[ied] and mostly fail[ed] to qualify for separate-claim
removal."3 41
Growing out of the Study Committee's recommendation for
the establishment of bankruptcy appellate panels in each circuit, a
provision of the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation
Act of 1990 permits the judicial councils of two or more circuits, if
authorized by the Judicial Conference of the United States, to es-
tablish a joint bankruptcy panel comprised of bankruptcy judges
from districts within each circuit.342 The Implementation Act re-
vises the venue provisions to make them substantially identical for
diversity and federal question purposes,3 43 adds a four-year statute
of limitations for civil actions accruing under acts of Congress
passed after December 1, 1990,344 and empowers the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules to define when a district court ruling is
final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 345 Although some of these matters
may be helpful in making a "better" federal judicial system, they
certainly do not bear on the .overwhelming caseloads facing the
339 Id.
310 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1988).
3,1 STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 70, at 95.
342 Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, § 305(2).
313 Id. § 311. Although Congress attempted to make the provisions for diversity and
federal question jurisdiction nearly parallel to the venue provisions, the recent amendment
to the venue statute, see id. § 311(a)(3), appears to eliminate entirely venue requirements in
diversity cases. The Judicial Conference Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction ("Com-
mittee") discovered that the phrase, "if there is no district in which the action may other-
wise be brought," was inadvertently excluded from § 311(a)(3) of the Judicial Improvements
Act, seemingly abolishing any independent venue requirement in diversity cases. The provi-
sion as amended appears to provide that venue lies in diversity cases if personal jurisdiction
can be established. The Committee recommended to the Judicial Conference that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a)(3) be amended, by reinserting the excluded phrase. See SUMMARY OF THE REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE JURISDICTION (Mar. 1991). The
Judicial Conference agreed with the Committee's recommendation and will seek legislation
to amend the statute accordingly. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT OF THE ACTIONs TAKEN BY THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 4 (Mar. 12, 1991).
344 Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, § 313(a).
3-5 Id. § 315.
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federal courts. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 in a sense
provided "more of the same"-additional judges to cope with the
crisis. Indeed, despite all the Committee's talk about not wanting a
federal judiciary of "thousands," the Study Committee recom-
mended that "Congress should quickly provide the additional ap-
pellate judgeships that the Judicial Conference has requested. '34 6
The Committee observed that sixteen new judgeships for the
courts of appeals were requested, based on 1987 statistics; that
more would be required on the basis of more current figures; that
"[t]he courts of appeals are reluctant to request additional judge-
ships because of concern about problems associated with circuit
growth;" and that "requests invariably fall below the number that
would be dictated by blind application of statistical standards. 3 47
Title II of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, designated the
"Federal Judgeship Act of 1990," provided for eleven new circuit
judgeships. 8
As further indication that the message of the Federal Courts
Study Committee has not been afforded proper respect in Con-
gress, one need look no further than Title I of the Judicial Im-
provements Act of 1990: the "Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. ' '14 9
The Reform Act, an outgrowth of a congressional plan to micro-
manage the federal court system, requires each United States Dis-
trict Court to implement a "civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plan. '350 The purposes of the plan are "to facilitate deliberate
adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, im-
prove litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inex-
pensive resolutions of civil disputes."3 51 This seems to describe just
the enterprise of the federal court system, working as best it can
3'6 STUDY Comw=rrE REPORT, supra note 70, at 112.
347 Id.
3" Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, § 202(a).
"I Id. § 101. A number of additional recommendations of the Study Committee have
found expression in a bill (S. 1569) entitled "Federal Courts Study Committee Implementa-
tion Act of 1991" introduced by Senator Heflin, who is one of the congressional members of
the Committee. The bill would authorize a five year pilot plan to resolve inter-circuit con-
flicts by allowing the Supreme Court to refer cases to a circuit court that had not yet ruled
on the issue in conflict; direct Congress to consider the judicial impact of proposed legisla-
tion; require the establishment of bankruptcy appellate panels in each circuit unless a judi-
cial council elects to create a joint panel with another circuit; and abolish the temporary
emergency court of appeals. Federal Courts Study Committee Bill Introduced, 23 The
Third Branch, Aug. 1991, at 5.
:so Id. § 103(a) (adding § 471 to title 28).
" Id.; Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 22, § 103(a).
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against overwhelming odds. The courts are operating now in excess
of full capacity, and, while court management can do wonders in
improving court efficiency, it seems ludicrous to spend any length
of time -establishing "systems" and other bureaucratic devices that
promise to waste more valuable time than is available for these
purposes.
The problem with the legislation in question is that it is so
detailed and time-consuming as to be counterproductive. The at-
tention of the Congress to court jurisdiction and structure would
be much more fruitful than its attention to administrative matters
that are better dealt with by the courts themselves. The legislation
calls for the chief judge of each district court to appoint an advi-
sory group by March 1, 1991 to assist in the development of an
expense and delay reduction plan.352 The United States Attorney
or his designee as well as attorneys and other persons representa-
tive'of major categories of litigants must be included in the
group, 53 and a compensated reporter may be appointed.3" Each
advisory group is required to submit a report containing an assess-
ment of the court's workload and a recommendation for a model
plan. 55 After considering the recommendations, the court must
adopt an appropriate plan and distribute copies to the Judicial
Council and chief district judges in the circuit. 56 The chief district
judges and the chief judge of the circuit serve as a review commit-
tee and may suggest revisions.357 The Judicial Conference reviews
each plan and also may suggest revisions.35 1
Although the components of each court's plan are not man-
dated, the Act lists six principles and six techniques of litigation
management to be considered for inclusion in the plan.3 59 Empha-
52 Id. (adding § 478(a) to title 28).
353 Id. (adding § 478(b) to title 28).
354 Id. (adding § 478(c) to title 28).
Id. (adding § 478(b) to title 28).
Id. (adding § 472(d) to title 28).
357 Id. (adding § 474(a)(1) to title 28).
"I Id. (adding § 474(b) to title 28).
111 Id. (adding § 473 to title 28). Such techniques include: (1) individualized case treat-
ment that is responsive to considerations such as preparation time required, case complex-
ity, and resources at the court's disposal; (2) involvement of judicial officer in pretrial phase;
(3) case management conferences in proper instances; (4) endorsement of "cost-effective dis-
covery"; (5) requirement that party making discovery motion first certify that he or she "has
made a reasonable and good faith effort to reach agreement with opposing counsel"; and (6)
institution of alternative dispute resolution referral policy. Id.
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sized is the need for differentiated case management36 and the in-
volvement of a judicial officer in the pretrial phase of the litigation
process.3 1 A pilot program must be implemented by the Judicial
Conference in ten districts to be designated by the Conference, five
in major metropolitan areas, by December 31, 1991.362 The South-
ern District of New York in the Second Circuit already has been
chosen for the pilot program.363 The pilot programs must incorpo-
rate the six principles of litigation management and cost and delay
reduction. Ultimately, a study will be made to compare the results
of the pilot programs with ten comparable districts that did not
utilize the techniques required of the pilot programs. The Act pro-
vides for certain demonstration programs,64 statistical reports, a
manual for litigation management, and comprehensive training
programs for all judicial and nonjudicial personnel.3 65 In view of
the ongoing programs conducted by the Federal Judicial Center
and by individual courts over the years, the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 seems especially unnecessary and wasteful to many
who toil in the system. 6
VII. CONCLUSION
The report of the Federal Courts Study Committee is a valua-
ble planning tool for the future. The extent to which its recom-
mendations will need to be implemented is dependent in large part
upon future caseload trends. In the absence of major adjustments
in jurisdiction or structure, however, the expected continuation of
growth will have a devastating effect on the ability of the federal
court system to perform its functions with the fairness, dispatch,
and efficiency expected of it. In some areas of the country, the fed-
eral courts have virtually become criminal courts, due to the unre-
strained expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction. Despite many
proposals for adjustments of various kinds made over the years,
the customary congressional response has been to add more judges.
Id. (adding § 473(a)(1) to title 28).
Id. (adding § 473(a)(2) to title 28).
362 Id. § 105.
363 JUDICUL. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 343, at 3.
364 Judicial Improvements Act, supra note 20, § 104.
"I Id. § 103(a) (adding §§ 479 & 480 to title 28).
311 It appears that the Civil Justice Reform Act has spurred the Judiciary into action.
Chief Justice Rehnquist has appointed a committee within the judiciary to oversee long
range planning. Judges Devise Courts Plan to Keep up with Times, The Miami Herald,
Apr. 8, 1991, at 36.
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The federal court system cannot be effective in the performance of
the work expected of it if it becomes merely a duplicate of the
state court system.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals is faced with the types of
problems that affect federal courts generally as it enters the second
century of its life. Fortunately, it has over the years developed ef-
fective responses to its mounting caseloads and even today is able
to function in a satisfactory manner, both in the quality of its work
and in the speed with which its decisions are rendered. A combina-
tion of custom-tailored procedures, unique practices, revered tradi-
tions, and continued fine-tuning of the decisional processes and
management techniques have enabled the court to function as it
does. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
will draw on the work of the Federal Court Study Committee but
will continue on its own to develop methods and techniques and to
experiment with ways and means to cope with its important duties.
Favored with outstanding leadership and hard-working judges, the
Second Circuit begins its second century as it began its
first-challenged by the turmoil of the times and prepared to meet
the challenge.
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